Would You Believe "Possible Cause?"
Tim Cavanaugh | May 7, 2006, 2:56pm
Lt. Gen. Michael Hayden, America's foremost Kurtwood Smith lookalike and President Bush's probable choice to replace Porter Goss as Director of Central Intelligence, gives a less-than-strict constructionist reading of his all-time favorite amendment to the U.S. Constitution:
QUESTION: Jonathan Landay with Knight Ridder. I'd like to stay on the same issue, and that had to do with the standard by which you use to target your wiretaps. I'm no lawyer, but my understanding is that the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution specifies that you must have probable cause to be able to do a search that does not violate an American's right against unlawful searches and seizures. Do you use
GEN. HAYDEN: No, actuallythe Fourth Amendment actually protects all of us against unreasonable search and seizure. That's what it says.
QUESTION: But the measure is probable cause, I believe.
GEN. HAYDEN: The amendment says unreasonable search and seizure.
QUESTION: But does it not say probable
GEN. HAYDEN: No. The amendment says unreasonable search and seizure...
GEN. HAYDEN: ... Just to be very clearand believe me, if there's any amendment to the Constitution that employees of the National Security Agency are familiar with, it's the Fourth.
Video clip, courtesy of reader Les Milton, here.
The Fightin' Fourth, once again, reads as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
En Español:
El derecho de los habitantes de que sus personas, domicilios, papeles y efectos se hallen a salvo de pesquisas y aprehensiones arbitrarias, será inviolable, y no se expedirán al efecto mandamientos que no se apoyen en un motivo verosimil, estén corroborados mediante juramento o protesta y describan con particularidad el lugar que deba ser registrado y las personas o cosas que han de ser detenidas o embargadas.
Law Student #2 | May 7, 2006, 3:28pm | #
I just took my criminal procedure final a week ago, so we'll have to wait until grades come in to determine the merits of my input.
The Fourth Amendment, grammatically, is two independent clauses.
1. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.
2. No Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. Given that, is a warrant always required, or only when it would be unreasonable to act without one?
So the question is when do you need a warrant. The answer could plausibly be "never," but, on the other hand, why even have a standard for warrants if they are never required?
We are actually lucky that, in the 60s, the Court abandoned the "physical trespass" standard so that we might consider a wiretap a "search."
Anyway, this is all very esoteric. The point is that the general's statements offers some insight into where the NSA falls on the debate: the logically untenable position of never needing a warrant.
Xrlq | May 8, 2006, 1:48pm | #
Anon2, the syntactic ambiguity is interesting, but if you read it carefully, you'll see why it can't be right. As with most syntactic ambiguities (
cf. "the kids are ready to eat"), common sense suffices to disambiguate. Under either reading of the Fourth Amendment, there will be two requirements, one relating to searches and seizures, the other to warrants. Under the traditional reading, which Tim ripped Gen. Hayden a new one over, the requirements are as follows:
1. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.
2. No Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
If, however, we were to adopt the other syntactically permissible reading, in which the probable cause requirement attached to the entire sentence rather than merely the second clause, we'd end up with these two requirements, instead:
1. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
2. No Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Both readings result in the same requirement for warrants, but only one (mine) results in a coherent requirement for searches and seizures. The other would still only generally protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures, but once the probable cause requirements were met, it wouldn't even do that.
Joe:
You are deliberately playing dumb to get the result you want, by reading the language as if you are wholly ignorant of the need to acquire a warrant absent compelling circumstances.
I'm playing dumb?! You're the one conflating three separate concepts of reasonableness, probable cause, and search warrants, not me. I'm not arguing for a position I necesasarily want, but for the only legally, rationally and grammatically defensible one: warrants and searches/seizures are different.
Pray tell, where in that language is the statement that a warrant must EVER be obtained?
There is no such requirement, at least not explicitly.
Implicitly, however, one could reasonably that the framers intended to leave the requirements for obtaining search warrants essentially as they were,
i.e., where police could conduct a warrantless search under common law, they could continue to do so under our Constitution; and where they couldn't, they couldn't. Alternatively, there's the general "reasonableness" requirement, which could be (and typically is) invoked to require cops to obtain warrants in situations where it is reasonable to require them to do so, and therefore unreasonable for them to fail to comply. But there has never been a flat-out ban on warrantless searches, not before the Revolution, not after it, and not immediately after the Bill of Rights was ratified.
Ergo, it is impossible to read the amendment as "plain text" only, without an understanding of what a warrant is and what it is used for. Once you allow this understanding into your analsyis (as the authors of the Constitution did, since they didn't deem it necessary to define what a warrant is or what it is used for, which means they assumed their readers would know already), it becomes impossible to read the second clause as anything but an expansion of th idea in the first; ie, a description of how to make sure a search is reasonable.
Nonsense. If the drafters had intended to impose the same restriction on warrants as they did on searches and seizures, they could have easily drafted the Fourth Amendment that way. They didn't, because they didn't want to. They wanted a general protection against unreasonable searches, but they also wanted a flat out ban on general warrants, whether our courts thought they were reasonable or not. That's why the standards are different; prior to the Revolution, general warrants were a real problem, while general proclamations of reasonableness were not.
Kris | May 10, 2006, 1:41am | #
As I read the article, it seems as though this pronouncement of General Hayden's incompetence is due to pundits misinterpreting the exchange between him and Mr. Landay.
Mr. Landay's original contention was that
" the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution specifies that you must have probable cause to be able to do a search that does not violate an American's right against unlawful searches and seizures."
General Hayden replied
"No, actually—the Fourth Amendment actually protects all of us against unreasonable search and seizure. That's what it says."
From his reply, I assume his focus was on Mr. Landay's use of the word "lawful" in place of the word "unreasonable". As the 4th reads "unreasonable search and seizure", I can see why he would choose to focus on Mr. Landay's incorrect use of language.
Mr. Landay responded with
"But the measure is probable cause, I believe."
If you think about it, Mr. Landay's focus here is on the stated exception to the "no Warrants" rule, "probable cause".
Mr. Landay didn't notice that, in his previous statement, General Hayden's focus was on the language describing the nature of the searches and seizures prohibited, and some other feature of the amendment, such as the "probable cause" exception.
General Hayden responded with
"The amendment says unreasonable search and seizure."
Which is a reiteration of his original point, that Mr. Landay misstated the language of the amendment.
General Hayden didn't note that, in his previous line, Mr. Landay's focus was now on the exception, and not, as he assumed, on the language describing the nature of the prohibited searches and seizures.
So, what happened in this exchange was that the General and the Correspondent began talking about two distinctly different, but related, subjects, both of which were related to the 4th amendment: the language describing the prohibited type of search and seizure, and the exception to that prohibition.
It seems to me that, once he noticed Mr. Landry's misstatement, he continued to reiterate his point that he misspoke, rather than listen to what Mr. Landry had to say.
What played out here was a simple miscommunication of thoughts. It doesn't seem fair to blame the General for this, nor to dismiss him as incompetent.