In Defense of -- gasp -- Rummy
Jeff Taylor | December 8, 2004, 3:01pm
First, in a contest of who'd be more fun to have a beer with, Spc. Thomas Wilson and his balls of steel trump Rummy's squinty CEO bluster by a parsec. But the secretary did have something of point that is being lost in the rush to declare up-armored Humvees the solution to all the world's problems.
Truth is most U.S. military vehicles have required some kind of armor upgrade to withstand the volleys of RPGs and large-munition roadside bombs the Iraq conflict has produced. The Stryker units have what looks like steel grating around them to throw up an anti-RPG "fence," photos of Bradleys show what looks like reactive armor kits in place, and even the mighty Abrams appear to have been modified with extra plating.
So it is just not a case of the bloodless Pentagon stiffing the Guard and Reserves with thin-skinned Humvees, as some of the comments today seem to suggest. Rummy was right, if typically tone-deaf, by telling Wilson he could get blown up in a tank too.
Further, more armor is not a magical solution, never has been. It is represents a trade-off between protection and mobility, just as in the age of knights when if the peasants managed to violently unhorse an up-armored foe, they could go off and have lunch and leave the knight flailing face down in the mud. If he didn't drown, you could always stab him in the eye-slits later.
The preference for less armor can be seen today with at least some Marines in Fallujah. They point out that up-armoring their Humvees reduces the ability to see threats coming. Oh, but they bitch that the regular Army gets all the good stuff anyway, so at least that's square.
Finally, was it a disgrace or outrage that American tankers in Normandy had to cut up German steel obstacles to make hedge-cutting teeth for their tanks? No, it was an inspired response to the insanity of war. Rummy being nuts has very little to do with this sad and eternal fact.
Lance | December 9, 2004, 9:58am | #
The argument about transformation is an interesting one. I don't see that anybody really seems to understand it on this thread, but exactly what mix of forces and equipment is precisely correct is a point of great contention. From what I can see everyone thinks they know, and they are all wrong. Why? Because each conflict and situation is different, the situation changes after the start of combat, and the best answer to many issues is developed from experience.
I am usually unimpressed with arguments that assume those in charge are idiots. Rumsfeld may have been wrong about many things, but we seem to be ignoring the many benefits of his approach (which those describing his approach don't seem to understand, i.e. Rummy is not trying to centralize everything. Maybe he should be stressing an even less centralized approach, but no standing army this century has utilized decentralized approaches more than the force fielded by this administration.)
Rummy isn't an idiot. He has done many things wrong because large enterprises always do. More importantly whatever his faults, as Jeff pointed out, Rummy's response that we fight with the army we have, not the one we might want is absolutely correct. Rummy is using an army primarily equipped long before he became secretary of defense. It is not simply a matter of seeing a need and filling it. Production has to be ramped up. It has to be decided what are the tradeoffs in making the changes, how many vehicles actually need to be upgraded (and I use that term advisedly since in the next operation we may find we have changed the vehicles in ways which degrade operational effectiveness given the new situation) etc. Then the bureaucracy takes over, plants often can't physically handle the volume, there are turf fights over all kinds of issues, the bid process is questioned, quality versus expense versus speed in delivery in choosing vendors, on and on. It is fashionable to gripe at the whatever the current administration is when this happens, but I would assume one of the reasons many of the readers of this site have a libertarian perspective is because we know it is always this way, whoever is in charge. If Rummy slashes red tape and the interminable bidding process we have accusations of malfeasance and favoritism (see Haliburton, Bechtel.)
To sum it up, even if Rummy had had the foresight to predict the shape and characteristics of the resistance, the situation with the hummers and many other issues would have still existed. If resources had been applied earlier and in greater quantity on these issues we would have others to complain about. That is the nature of living in a world of tradeoffs, scarcity and radically imperfect knowledge complicated by war and bureaucracy in any large organization.
I too have many complaints with Rummy, but I have had many with every administrator our government has ever had. Rarely is it because they are as awful as partisans tend to portray them. Much of what Rummy has overseen has been breathtakingly successful. Others have seemed frustratingly inept (though usually I admit in my criticism that the correct answer may not have been as obvious as me or anyone else wants to admit, and critics of such things have the advantage of not having their opinions falsified.) This issue falls into neither camp, but is just the way it is. I tend to judge Rummy by historical standards first, absolute standards second. By historical standards the preparation of our forces in training and equipment (I am not talking about strategic planning) has been better than any army the world has ever seen. It is much better than under Clinton, Bush I, Reagan or any previous army. Of course some of that credit must go to the previous administration. By absolute standards it has a ways to go. Unfortunately that will always be true.
joe | December 9, 2004, 11:44am | #
"rummy's transformation -- smaller, lighter forces -- is proving to be a colossal error of policy for the kind of war they want to fight."
Actually, the military did remarkably well in the kind of war Rumsfeld wants to fight - that is, the drive from Kuwait through Baghdad to Tikrit. The lighter, faster military beat the snot out of the Iraqis' main battle forces.
The problem is, Rumsfeld/Cheney/Bush assumed that that was the war they were getting into, and didn't send an army prepared to fight the war that they actually had to fight. This isn't just about unarmoured Humvies, but about inadequate forces to guard important facilities, road, and borders once the government collapsed, the decision to disband the Iraqi regular army, and the entire litany of mistakes that allowed Iraq to turn into a guerilla insurgency.
What's happened in Iraq doesn't contradict Rumsfeld's vision for a quicker, lighter, more responsive military's ability to win military engagements. The pre-flight suit day campaign demonstrates exactly the opposite. What's happened in Iraq since then contradict's the administration's strategic thinking on a much higher level - their ability to understand the nature of the conflict we're involved in, the nature of the enemy, and the basic shape of the global security situation.
Rumsfeld didn't bother to send an army capable of securing Iraq, because he assumed we wouldn't have to. He bought into the "History Changing Battles" fairy tales of people like Victor D. Hansen. Once we achieved an overwhelming military victory, the Iraqis and the rest of the region were going to fall on their knees, repent, and reorganize their society along the lines we'd prefer. So why would we need our forces in Iraq to be equipped for a stabily/counterinsurgency operation?
Todd | December 9, 2004, 12:20pm | #
What a lot of people seem to be forgetting is that the SecDef, the second most senior leader in the military chain of command, was not only questioned, but answered as many of those questions as he could.
If Rumsfeld was as dodgy and obstinate as many of you suggest, why put himself in that position in the first place? Better to have avoided the whole meeting thing and flown directly home from the presidential swearing in ceremony that was the result of the "election that was never going to happen because there was to much violence in the country that could never be fully taken because the terrain was to bad and the enemy to prevalent...."
Another thing that many people seem to willing forget or gloss over, is that under the Goldwater-Nichols reform act, the CinC of the area command, in this case General Abezaid (sp?) of Centcom) has the next to final authority on what does or does not happen. Abezaid is there (unless he's shuttling back and forth to McDill and the Senate committees and whatnot). The Commanders and generals on the ground are there.
Why aren't they screaming for more troops?
How is it some journalist in the Green Zone, whose never been outside the compound, or a senator or congressmen who has yet to go to the middle east, let alone Iraq, seems to know more about what’s needed than the guys who receive all the unfiltered intelligence?
Have mistakes been made in this conflict? Yes.
Name a conflict that went according to plan. Exactly according to plan.
Transformation is about fighting smaller, faster, and harder than anything else out there. And it worked, unless anyone here wants to dispute that Iraq and its ruling party wasn't destroyed or run off in less than a month. Hell, even the campaign in France, 1940 took longer. What Transformation was not equipped for, and what the DoD was not equipped for, was the revolt that followed, but then again, how do you predict such things? Disbanding the Iraqi Army was a bad idea, letting the looting happen was a bad thing as well, but you know what, shit happens in war, and sitting here months later bitching about what happened is solving what exactly?
Also, by the by, the hedgerows in Normandy were an Intelligence failure. Aerial Photographs clearly showed the hedgerows, but planners thought they were like the "English" hedgerows, planted in the ground and neatly trimmed very once and awhile. They had no actual HUMINT from anyone in the Normandy area telling them these were actually berms planted with hedges and trees that had been there for years, if not decades and centuries, and would be some of the most overgrown areas they would encounter.
Can you imagine the MSM's reaction today to such a situation?
Also, in perfect (or good) weather conditions, armored knights can move with relative ease and grace. In some cases, getting on a horse can be tough, especially wearing the heavier tournament armor, so a winch contraption was used from time to time. It wasn't prevalent. Agincourt happened as a result of bad weather and French impetuosity, the knight who were shot of their horses fell down into a field of mud and could not get the footing to get back up.
Three peasants can indeed kill a knight pretty easily, but more than a few factors have to be met for that to happen, and peasants weren't exactly known for their bravery in battle.
Todd
Patrick | December 12, 2004, 10:05pm | #
"Putting aside the question of whether or not Rummy's reasoning was valid, why would Rumsfeld make himself the centerpiece of what was, essentially, a talk show format for marines to take shots at?"
Because Rumsfeld is a brilliant standup guy who has the best interests of the military at heart.
Seriously. Go here http://www.missick.com/ and read a real 1st hand report on the visit.
Besides, he has taken far more annoying and worse questions at each and every press conference.
Also, check my blog for some facts about the up-armor situation: level 1 armored Humvee production went from 30 a month last year to 450 a month now, and 6,000 of those plus 10,000 factory armor-kit vehicles are in use. Then some vehicles, mainly cargo trucks, have plates protecting the cabs (level 3) - Of 30,000 vehicles in theatre,
70% have armor, and the rest are used on base or in rear areas where the armor is not useful.
The blunt fact is, the issue has been recognized for over a year by DoD as a serious one and has been adequately worked on by them. No unit is going into Iraq without the armor needed; as they deploy they are getting 'up-armored' at shops in Kuwait for those vehicles not already outfitted. Any vehicle without armor is transported by flatbed to its base and used on-base only. (see DoD press conference of Thursday for details).
Reality completely obliterates the MSM hand-wringing on this. Sure, it's a concern,
but it's not a 'fiasco' or 'scandal' or the other terms that the MSM Rummy-bashers use.
"not why they don't have armor on them yet, it is why were they ever made in the first place without armor? I've always thought it was odd."
Not odd at all... they were not designed for heavy combat but as transport... the more armor, the more logistics it takes to move them.
If more armor was always the right answer, every Army vehicle would look like an M1A1 tank. It isnt because there are always tradeoffs. The original author is correct. More is not always better when it comes to armor. OTOH, the insurgents attacked with RPGs and IEDs precisely because they are effective against our vehicles, so the balance of best-fit-to-use shifted from 'less armor' to 'more armor'.
