"Reform is the Only Path to Our Return to History"
Charles Paul Freund | September 23, 2004, 1:12pm
A few echoes of the Arab world's own debate about its future:
Syrian academic Mundir Badr Haloum, who like many Arabs is revolted by the continuing wave of religious murder and terror, has published a powerful call for religious reform, linking it with the necessity of political reform. The translation of his piece, which originally appeared in a Lebanese newspaper, is posted on MEMRI's site.
"Islam is in need of true reform," writes Haloum. "Islam's need [for reform] -- or, to be precise, our need for Islam's reform -- is not less than the need for reform in the Arab political regimes... This is the need for people who are capable of fearlessly acknowledging that terrorism nests within us as Muslims and that we must exorcise it... Unfortunately, the meaning of delay is more death... The reform will take a long time and the price will be high, but it is the only path to our return to history as Muslims and not as terrorists...."
MEMRI has also posted an angry essay by journalist Dr. Shaker Al-Nabulsi, which first appeared on a leftist Arabic Internet site. Al-Nabulsi asks, "Why have the Arabs Gone Crazy in Such a Manner?"
Finally, IraqPundit briefly notes some of the wary reaction in the Arab press to Ayad Allawi's "warm" handshake with Israel's UN ambassador.
Jason Ligon | September 24, 2004, 5:52pm | #
"Jason, as I recall, you cited the need (and presumably feasibility) of regional transformation as an important justification for invading Iraq."
True enough, it was on the list and I think its feasibility is up in the air under the approach of establishing order, incubating ideas, and so forth. The problem, it turns out, is that nobody understands that the carrot is a carrot.
Like everyone in these parts I presume, I have evaluated my initial position on Iraq several times over the last couple of years. What I have come to recently is not that reform of the region is unimportant or unattainable. I have come to the conclusion that it is VERY important and likely unattainable without killing a great number of people.
I believe, as I always have, that the focus on AQ as a group of criminals is naive. I believe, as I always have, that the leadership of AQ and those funding them are making power plays for personal gain and could frankly give a rat's ass about Palestine.
Where I believe I was mistaken was in my optimism about the power of freedom to transform and, more importantly, in my belief that the average muslim that cheers in the street about American deaths is best viewed as a hapless victim. AQ isn't the problem, really. With the resources at our disposal, we could hunt them all down and kill them easily.
The problem is the shield of the terrorist. The terrorist uses human shields and common cause with the expectation that you are not willing to kill as many people as he is. That guy cheering in the street? HE is the problem. Without him, AQ is gone in a month. He is not a victim, he is what makes the whole process cyclic. Some argue that he is responsible for securing his own liberty, and that is none of our business. Okay, but if he is responsible for standing up to his government, he is by god responsible for standing up to the terrorists standing behind him that are trying to kill us. He is certainly responsible for any action on his part that makes the terrorist acceptable.
What I now see is a place that is willing to take not one step toward securing its own liberty, where the terrorists that kill Iraqis and Americans consistently poll higher than the troops trying to stop them. I will grant that the carrot we offer is a difficult sell in a climate of chaos, but demonstrably, that guy celebrating in the street chooses the terrorists when presented with options. The carrot doesn't work by itself.
Many muslims, in fits of self pity, believe they have seen the stick. They are mistaken, and they forget the extent to which they are protected by the unwillingness of victims of terrorism to kill them. If they are not only a part of the problem, but are the most important part of the problem, perhaps only a very high death toll in retaliation for a terrorist act will raise the perceived cost of choosing the terrorist sufficiently for the problem to go away.
In summary, I don't know that we can really offer them a carrot that is remotely meaningful enough to fundamentally start seeing the terrorist as a vile murderer instead of a hero. The US, or perhaps Putin, may be able to make the point another way, though.
thoreau | September 24, 2004, 6:37pm | #
I believe, as I always have, that the leadership of AQ and those funding them are making power plays for personal gain and could frankly give a rat's ass about Palestine.
Absolutely. Now, what about the people turning blind eyes? The recruits who decide to join? Do those people care about Palestine? As you pointed out, the leaders wouldn't be nearly as much of a problem without their foot soldiers and the numerous people turning blind eyes.
AQ isn't the problem, really. With the resources at our disposal, we could hunt them all down and kill them easily.
Then why haven't we gotten all of their leaders yet?
I think the claims of what we could have done in Afghanistan with more troops are red herrings, because the real problem in Afghanistan is Pakistan, and that is a political rather than military problem.
I partially agree. I don't think we should underestimate the potential value of having more troops in Afghanistan. On the other hand, I do agree that as long as the Afghan-Pakistani border is so porous there's a limit to what we can do there. And the problems with Pakistan are numerous.
As far as I can tell from what I read in various news sources, the most charitable take on Musharaf is that he's playing a balancing act. Under this interpretation he's not fully in control of his country's intelligence services and elements of the military. These groups have a lot of sympathies for the Islamists. Khan, the nuclear scientist who helped Libya, North Korea, etc., got a slap on the wrist because Musharaf couldn't do anything more without risking an Islamist revolt aided and abetted by elements of the military and intelligence services.
However, Musharaf also uses the Islamists as a counter-weight against liberals, because Musharaf (like any general who seizes power away from an elected gov't) cares first and foremost about Musharaf. He wasn't exactly upset when the Islamists took control of 2 of the 4 provinces in provincial elections.
If I could go back in time and advise the generals on the invasion of Afghanistan, my first piece of advice would have been to put as many boots on the ground as possible in key areas as close to the Pakistani border as possible. I realize that one can't control every inch of the border with Pakistan, but it would have enabled us to catch the remnants of Al Qaeda and the Taliban in a vice as they fled to their buddies in Pakistan. Then again, maybe if we had done this they would have fled to Iran.
In any case, if I could go back in time I'd tell the Pentagon not to use any war plan that counts on reliable support from Pakistan.