Does Genetic Testing Doom Private Insurance?
Ronald Bailey | May 2, 2008, 10:09am
Americans are concerned about how their genetic information might be used against them by insurers and employers. To address these fears, both the House and Senate have passed the Genetic Information Non-Discrimination Act (GINA) which outlaws such discrimination by health insurers and employers. The law does not apparently apply to long-term care and life insurers.
The idea of insurance is that people pool premiums together in order to cover unknown risks. What happens when individual risks are no longer unknown? Do better and more accurate genetic tests create the possibility of an adverse selection spiral? Perhaps. People who find that their genetic tests indicate that they have a much higher risk of a particularly debilitating illness, say Alzheimer's disease, might load up with gold-plated insurance. As more and more high-risk people buy insurance, insurers would have to raise their rates in order to pay for their medical care. Higher rates would then discourage relatively healthy people from buying insurance which then means insurers would have to raise their rates further and so forth until bankruptcy.
The prospect of such an adverse selection spiral is not displeasing to advocates of government-supplied health care. As the New York Times reports:
It may also give ammunition to those who argue for universal health care. “Ultimately unlocking all these genetic secrets will make the whole idea of private health insurance obsolete,” said Karen Pollitz, director of the Health Policy Institute at Georgetown University.
Will pervasive genetic testing ineluctably lead down the slippery slope to government medical care? I believe that one way to avoid that outcome may be mandatory private insurance based on community rating. No doubt about it, the dawning of the era of genetic diagnoses holds great promise for treating and preventing diseases but also clearly poses many policy conundrums.
Disclosure: Even before GINA passed, I sent my DNA into 23andMe for testing. Look for a future reason article in which I reveal all of my genetic flaws.
Fluffy | May 2, 2008, 10:37am | #
Ron:
I think that once you escape the premise that the purpose of insurance is the pooling of risk, the argument that genetic testing makes insurance untenable becomes...untenable.
The argument depends on the notion that the idea of insurance is undermined if insurers can more accurately predict their risks. But if the purpose of insurance is to hedge risk rather than to pool it, the fact that it is more expensive for some people with high levels of genetic risk to get insurance isn't a bug, it's a feature.
I think the "adverse selection spiral" you're talking about would result - in a free insurance market, which we currently don't have - in a small number of consumers being uninsurable and a much larger number of consumers experiencing lower rates.
There really is no "system" benefit to having information hidden from insurers. All of the benefit accrues to the people who are bad risks. It's a personal benefit for them, not a system benefit.
There is also a great likelihood that genetic testing will lower overall medical costs, by allowing for early intervention. Even among people who suffer higher premiums because a genetic predilection to, say, heart disease turns up in their test, it is possible they will experience lower costs over time because they are forewarned and can take corrective action earlier.
There's also a chance that genetic testing over time will produce such a superfluity of information that its effect on premium pricing will become negligible over time. If genetic testing starts to turn up a huge number of risk factors
and positive factors for almost all consumers [which is probably likely] then it won't be the Pandora's Box it has been advertised be.
But even if neither of those "compensating factors" occurs, I still think that we need to vigorously dispute the idea that insurance is somehow "failing" conceptually if people have to pay for real risks. If information is the enemy of your concept of justness or fairness, there is something wrong with your concept of justice or fairness.
Geotpf | May 2, 2008, 11:10am | #
Fluffy | May 2, 2008, 10:41am | #
The question libertarians must ask themselves is "Which form is least sub-optimal"?
Personally, if I had to choose I would rather see a system where insurers could use this information, and if it produced a set of consumers who could not obtain insurance, those consumers were able to enter a system where the government paid for their health care on a means-tested basis.
Better to pay for the health care of the worst risks than to pay for it [and, of course, ration it as a result] for everyone.
I don't subscribe to the fact that government run health care needs to be rationed. Now, taxes should be high enough to pay for coverage.
Basically, the conflict here is this:
Do we want sick people to pay more (potentially, much, much,
much more) for their health care than healthy people, even if they are sick through no fault of their own?
Libertarians are in favor of sick people bankrupting themselves because they happened to get sick, frequently through no fault of their own, as opposed to having healthy people pay a little more to pay for them.
Also, I believe that the extra paperwork and unneeded tests and the like that private insurance forces doctors to do increases costs for everybody, healthy or sick.
Your plan has a real-world problem, in that healthy people, if they are not part of the governmental system, might not want their taxes to pay for the sick people if they are not also part of the system. Plus, there is still the whole excess-tests-and-paperwork problem, as private insurers do their best to dump the most expensive, sick patients on the government and keep the cheap, healthy ones.
Guy Montag | May 2, 2008, 11:14am | #
Andrew G.,
There's also a risk that people who find out via testing that they *aren't* at risk for anything will avoid insurance. Why pay for insurance if you're not predisposed to anything major? Just get enough to cover accidents.
The result may be that healthy people, knowing that they are going to be healthy for life, avoid buying insurance while unhealthy people run out to buy it.
A sort-of-example in real life would be me. If my civilian employer did not provide almost-free-to-me insurance (my opt-out amounts are really low, not really worth checking the blocks) I would not have any, by choice.
Well, okay, I get to find out what great health I am in by extensive, government provided, physicals. Ron and I exchanged some e-mail about my latest adventure. I now know that my heart is perfectly fine, I am just sloppy and out of shape, need to take fish oil and asprin, exercise, lose some weight. Otherwise, there is not really anything that can be done to improve my health. Probably got over-tested by a panicky flight surgeon, but no biggie to me.
Oh, I am on the verge of blindness and have to wear glasses to correct my bat-like 20/40 vision to 20/20, but knew that before the physical.
If the physicals, a requirement by the government for my services as an Aviator, were not provided in that bargain, I could just pay for my own physicals periodically and come out well ahead of paying insurance premiums.
One problem with that strategy would be if a condition was found, then it would be too late to get insurance due to a pre-existing condition, but that could open a whole new market of health industry products, couldn't it? Like surgery credit cards, or mortgages or something.