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Later She Was Seen Perusing the 'Sorry About the Torture' Section of the Hallmark Store

jsullum@reason.com (Jacob Sullum) — Thu, 25 Oct 2007 14:28:00 EDT

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has acknowledged that the U.S. government made a mistake in 2002 when it deported Canadian software engineer Maher Arar to Syria, the country of his birth, where he was imprisoned as a suspected terrorist for a year and tortured. Arar was arrested during a stopover in New York based on what turned out to be erroneous information from the Canadian government, which has since exonerated him, apologized, and paid him $11 million in compensation and legal fees. Rice, for her part, did not exactly apologize, telling the House Foreign Affairs Committee:

We do not think that this case was handled as it should have been. We do absolutely not wish to transfer anyone to any place in which they might be tortured....We have told the Canadian government that we did not think this was handled particularly well in terms of our own relationship and that we will try to do better in the future.

But Rice also indicated that the U.S. government is not prepared to meet the Canadian government's request that Arar be removed from a list that bars him from entering the United States. "I think we and the Canadians do not have exactly the same understanding of what is possible in the future with Mr. Arar in terms of travel and the like," she said.

My 2006 column about the Canadian report that exonerated Arar is here.

House of Saud, House of Assad

myoung@reason.com (Michael Young) — Thu, 28 Sep 2006 15:46:00 EDT

Last Monday, a Saudi newspaper, Okaz, published a story claiming that the latest United Nations report on the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri would directly implicate Syria. It suggested that Ghazi Kanaan, Syria's interior minister who supposedly committed suicide (or, as agnostics put it, "was suicided") last year, had recorded a conversation in which he detailed Syrian involvement in the crime. UN investigators would finger top officials in Damascus, the newspaper predicted, including President Bashar Assad's brother in law.

Two things were interesting in the allegation. First, it proved to be false. While Syria remains the leading culprit in the murder, the UN chief investigator, Serge Brammertz, played his cards close to his chest in his interim report, released on Monday, by failing to accuse anyone. Second, the possible existence of a Kanaan tape was first floated by a leading Syrian witness who had earlier given sworn testimony to the UN commission. The witness in question is believed to be close to the Saudis, even a Saudi tool in the investigation, whatever the veracity of his revelations. The parallels between his assertion and the Okaz article suggested that something was afoot.

The Saudis may also have known that Brammertz would not mention a Kanaan tape. In fact that's more than likely, since the UN investigator has for months imposed a near total blackout on information pertaining to the Hariri case. That's why it is reasonable to ask whether, in running the story, the Saudis were not really sending a different message: cautioning Assad that such a tape exists and could be used against him in the future.

Oddly enough, this splendidly Byzantine episode has implications for the United States. Saudi Arabia and Syria are reportedly near, if not beyond, the breaking point in their relations--largely because of Assad's close connection with Iran and his support for Hezbollah, which the Saudi monarchy and the Bush administration see as major threats. Given that the U.S. has few options when it comes to imposing "behavior change" in Syria--the administration's declared strategy--Saudi resentment creates new opportunities for it.

This was brought home to me last June, when I sat with an influential White House official and suggested that the behavior-change-rather-than regime-change mantra as applied to the Assad regime seemed not so much a policy as a bureaucratic compromise within the administration. Syria was not about to change its behavior, and the U.S. wasn't about to bounce Assad. To mask the deadlock, the U.S. had hit on the behavior-change formulation, which would broadly guide American action but probably lead nowhere.

The official disagreed, and underlined that he was waiting for the results of the UN investigation. This may not have been the most compelling of rebuttals, but it showed that some in Washington still saw the truth about Hariri's killing as Syria's Achilles heel.

Back to the Saudis. After Hariri's death in February 2005, the kingdom took a harsh line with Syria. Assad's decision to withdraw his forces from Lebanon followed a tense meeting with then-Crown Prince Abdullah, now the king, who handed the Syrian president an ultimatum. Subsequently, however, Saudi angst took over. With Syria out of Lebanon, Abdullah saw no advantage in destabilizing Assad's regime, as this might have destabilized the region. Riyadh's Syria policy throughout the early part of this year appeared to be run by the foreign minister, Saud Al-Faysal, a man universally recognized as a custodian of Arab immobility.

Though Assad should have been reassured, but he failed to reciprocate. Instead, he translated his growing confidence into closer ties with Iran. Last June, Syria and Iran signed a defense pact, a move that alarmed the Saudis, who fear Iran's hegemony over the Gulf, and its influence over the kingdom's Shiites, even more than they do democratic change. In July and August, Shiite-Sunni tension was on display as Lebanon fell into war. The Saudis publicly condemned Hezbollah for its cross-border abduction of two Israeli soldiers, accusing the party of "adventurism." They later helped engineer an Arab League foreign ministers' meeting in Beirut at which Syria's representative was isolated. The mainly Sunni states of the region saw the event as a means of containing Iran and clipping Hezbollah's wings in favor of the Lebanese government. Syria found itself on the wrong side of the Arab consensus.

The situation only got worse when Assad, in a fiery speech in August, called Arab leaders, without naming them, "half-men" for failing to support resistance against Israel.

The Saudi-Syrian estrangement, or divorce, came amid reports that Saudi decision-making on Syria had shifted away from Saud Al-Faysal to the head of the National Security Council, Bandar bin Sultan, previously the ambassador to the United States. From my conversations with Lebanese politician Walid Jumblatt, who keeps an open line to the Saudis, Bandar has advocated a tougher approach to Syria in their discussions than other royals. Assuming the change in attitude in the kingdom is being mainly driven by Bandar and his side of the ruling family, the U.S. might have more leverage in the near future to raise the heat on Damascus.

But one should never oversimplify with the Saudis. The ultimate decision-maker remains King Abdullah. If it's true that Ghazi Kanaan made an audio- or videotape implicating the Syrian regime, and that the Saudis have access to it, revealing this in Okaz was more likely a warning than a bid to push Assad out. Like the Americans, the Saudis want Syria to break with Iran and Hezbollah--behavior change; they do not want to bring about regime change that might boomerang against them, particularly if it means Iran comes to Assad's defense by playing hardball in the oil-rich provinces of the kingdom where there is a sizable Shiite population.

However, at some point the situation may slip away from everyone. Serge Brammertz is in nobody's pocket and his conclusions in the Hariri investigation could shake the foundations of the Syrian regime in ways the Saudis would feel uncomfortable with. If that came about, would they try working a smooth transition in Syria away from Assad, or would they seek to keep him in power in a much-weakened condition?

And how would the U.S. respond? The administration may now have a useful partner against Syria, but how the Saudis behave could overly determine America's own approach toward Iran's leading Arab ally. This might be better than the bureaucratic compromise to which the U.S. is sticking today, but it still wouldn't mean much latitude to effectively address a threatening Syria.

No Red Lines

myoung@reason.com (Michael Young) — Thu, 09 Feb 2006 00:00:00 EST

Lebanese Pierre Akel hosts the popular Web site Middle East Transparent, which receives 50,000-60,000 hits a day. While the Paris-based site is trilingual (Arabic, English, French), its particular value is that it has become a forum for Arab liberals who would otherwise have no outlet for their writings. Akel himself has written for Arabic newspapers in London and Paris. He moved to France in 1976, after studying economics at the American University of Beirut and philosophy at the Lebanese University. He also took history at the University of Paris, Sorbonne. He finances the site himself, and for the moment, only the enthusiasm of his readers and writers keeps him going.

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reason: Describe your Web site, Metransparent.com.�

Pierre Akel: In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks, it seemed to me that Arab liberals had to take a stand against the barbarian wave threatening to engulf the region. The danger was imminent. Only, no one could provide a comprehensive definition of Arab liberal currents. Americans tended to rely on English-speaking analysts, many of whom live in the United States and Europe. My friend Barry Rubin has written extensively on Arab liberals. However, Barry does not read Arabic and has what I call a "pro-Israel bias." He tends to shed a negative light on Arab liberals. I myself was much more familiar with the Islamic fundamentalist movement than with liberal currents. I had talked to the "Londonstan" leaders, read their writings and explored the many fundamentalist Web sites in Saudi Arabia.

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Metransparent was an attempt to explore such liberal currents as exist inside the Middle East. I discovered the different strains of Arab liberalism along with my readers. An independent Web site was necessary in order to allow people to write what they really had in mind, not merely what they were allowed to write. It was also necessary as a forum for the diverse currents in the region.

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To understand Arab liberalism, one has to understand not only what it now represents but where it emerged from: In Syria, it mostly comes from the remnants of the communist or Marxist left—just like the Eastern European dissidents of 30 years ago. In Saudi Arabia, it comes from the very heart of Islamic fundamentalist culture, but also from the orthodox Sunnis originating in the Hijaz, where the cities of Jeddah, Medina and Mecca are located. Hussein Shobokshi is a good example. It also comes from the Shiite minority in the oil producing Eastern Province. In Tunisia, it comes from the reformed Islamic university Al-Zaitouna. In Egypt, liberals are inspired by the great liberal tradition that was crushed by the late President Gamal Abdel Nasser. �

reason: What's your average day like when it comes to finding articles? Whose articles do you tend to run? �

Akel: We get our articles by email from practically every Arab country. Right now we have too many opinion pieces and are late in publishing what we receive. Most of the authors—we have more than 200—write exclusively for us; some send their articles to Arabic newspapers and to us, and we publish complete, uncensored versions. I believe we have something like 25 opinion articles from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates per week, a bit more from Egypt, and many more from Syria, which has a formidable civil society movement. Tunisians also contribute quite a bit, as well as Moroccans, especially Berber intellectuals, and Yemenis, Algerians, etc. �

I am especially proud to say that, soon, half of our writers shall be women. Usually, I receive letters from potential authors asking what "our conditions" are for accepting contributions. We answer back that we are a democratic and liberal Web site, with no censorship or red lines.

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The Web site also has a reputation as a forum for liberal Shiites, both Saudi and Lebanese. But, most importantly, I believe we are the most daring site in advocating an Islamic Reformation, as represented by such writers as Gamal Banna [the brother of the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hassan al-Banna], Judge Said al-Ashmawy, and Sayyid al-Qimny, all from Egypt; and by many writers in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Islamic reformers are part and parcel of the Arab liberal movement. Egypt and Saudi Arabia are the two countries where calls for an Islamic Reformation are the most advanced.

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reason: Is there room for Middle Eastern liberalism today, between dictatorships and Islamists? �

Akel: Remember the novel by Gabriel Garcia Marquez, The Autumn of the Patriarch, where people open the palace doors to discover that the dictator has been dead for a long time? This applied to the Soviet Union and now to Arab dictatorships as well. Dictatorships are dead; they lost the ideological and moral high ground years ago. The battle is between fundamentalists and liberals. Liberalism is the wave of the future. The Middle East is not like Afghanistan, if only because of oil, and cannot be allowed to turn into a Taliban-led region. Since 9/11 both Afghanistan and Iraq have been liberated. This is the trend. �

reason: Who do you feel are the liberal heroes in the region? Who do you find most interesting among political commentators? �

Akel: You can find liberals in unexpected places. Ahmad bin Baz, the son of the late mufti of Saudi Arabia, is certainly a liberal. He wrote stunning articles in Al-Sharq al-Awsat newspaper, but then was shelved. He was probably "advised" by the religious scholars to stop writing. Mansour al-Nogaidan and the great Wajeeha al-Huweider, the best Arab feminist nowadays, are brilliant Saudi liberal examples. Ali Doumaini is another. In Egypt, I already mentioned a few names, and can add to them Saad Eddin Ibrahim, Abdel Moneim Said, Ali Salem, and others.

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Of course, in Syria Riad Turk is a brilliant example of Arab liberalism. Though he spent some two decades in prison for his communist convictions, I talked to him for four hours and he never once mentioned Marx or Lenin. He even criticized the Lebanese Democratic Left Party, with which I am close, because for him being of the left is not necessary at this historical moment; a democratic movement, he told me, was enough and more adequate. �

The Tunisian Lafif Lakhdar is another radiant example. The Lebanese Shiite Sheikh Hani Fahs is a liberal writer. And of course the late Samir Kassir, whose assassination last June was a terrible blow to us all, both in Lebanon and in Syria. Kassir was the intellectual most aware of the organic relationship between the modern democratic movement in the contemporary Levant and the 19th-century Arab liberal renaissance known as Al-Nahda. �

reason: How has the Internet been able to affect political attitudes in the Middle East? Or has it? �

Akel: In the Arab world, much more than in the West, we can genuinely talk of a blog revolution. Arab culture has been decimated during the last 50 years. Arab newspapers are mainly under Saudi control. The book market is practically dead. Some of the best authors pay to have their books published in the order of 3,000 copies for a market of 150 million. This is ridiculous. Even when people write, they face censorship at every level—other than their own conscious or unconscious censorship. Meanwhile, professional journalism is rare.

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In the future, I would like Metransparent to promote tens (or even hundreds) of blogs representing human rights and activists groups in many Arab cities. This has already started. � Just to clarify a point about the Arab cultural scene. Freedom House writes a yearly report about the Arab world. It never mentions books. I have published official Iraqi censorship documents for the 1990s. Emile Zola, Agatha Christie, Shakespeare, Alexander Dumas, and tens of 19th-century Western writers were banned by Saddam Hussein. The list even included Learn English in Five Days. The whole of classical literature was banned by the Baathists.

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reason: In recent years the Middle Eastern satellite media has gained much prominence. How does the Internet compare to it, in your experience?

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Akel: When it comes to satellite television in the region, Al-Jazeera is controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood, while many of the rest are under Saudi control. Al-Arabiya, for example, is owned by the Al-Ibrahim, the brothers-in-law of the late King Fahd. Even the Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation cannot cross certain Saudi red lines. Yes, you can hear a liberal point of view here and there. But, to take one example, both Abdul Halim Khaddam, the former Syrian vice president who turned against the regime of President Bashar Assad, and Riad Turk, the Syrian dissident, have been under a Saudi ban from Al-Arabiya for the last month, because the Saudi leadership does not now want to annoy the Assad regime. For once, Al-Jazeera has also banned them, but for Qatari political reasons. Qatar is lobbying on behalf of the Syrian regime in Europe.

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On the Internet, people can publish whatever they want: no red lines. They can use pen names if they want. People read, send comments, and they transmit information to their friends by email and fax, etc. The regimes' monopoly on information has been broken. Remember: Three months ago a Libyan writer was assassinated and his fingers cut for writing articles on an opposition Web site. The Internet is a historical opportunity for Arab liberalism. �

Of course, liberals cannot compete with Al-Jazeera. We do not have the financial means to start a liberal satellite channel. Hundreds of Arab millionaires are liberals. Only, they cannot stand up to their regimes. Arab capitalism is mostly state capitalism. If you are in opposition, you are not awarded contracts by states. So, for the near future, we do not expect much help from these quarters.

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reason: How is Metransparent funded?

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Akel: We are not funded and are surviving by personal means. I have been paying all the expenses, because promises from a number of Arab businessmen never materialized. On many occasions I have thought of calling it a day and ending Metransparent. The burden is getting heavier every day. We are trying to get financial support free of political conditions, but that is not easy. The advertisement market is smaller when you are mostly an Arabic-language Web site. What keeps the site alive is the amazing reaction from the readers. Metransparent has 50,000–60,000 hits per day, with no publicity and no mailing campaigns on our part. This means there is demand. Plus, I find it hard to disappoint all those generous writers who have been with us for two years. Some of the Syrian writers do not even own a computer. They have to beg friends to type and email their articles. We shall keep on as long as possible. There is, probably, a light at the end of the tunnel. Or, we will close down.

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reason: Liberals have been among the most severe critics of the war in Iraq. However, one might say that for the first time the U.S. has rejected alliances with regional despots; that Iraq was a start; and that liberals have missed an opportunity by so vocally opposing the U.S.? How would you respond?

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Akel: Most liberals, at least among our writers, favored the U.S. military intervention in Iraq. I myself have written articles in support, before and after the invasion. I didn't support it because of Iraqi WMD, however, but for democracy. We would have liked President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair to say openly that they were invading to liberate the Iraqi people. Remember, even Riad Turk was not against the U.S. intervention. A Syrian, Abdul Razzaq Eid, who spent most of his life in the doctrinaire Syrian Communist Party of Khaled Bekdash, even wrote articles welcoming it.

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Things changed with the disaster that was Paul Bremer. The U.S. should have turned things over to the Iraqis immediately after liberation. Former Pentagon official Richard Perle was absolutely right about this point. Most liberals still believe the U.S. is serious about democracy, for reasons explained by Bush in his second inaugural address. Democracy in the Middle East has become a vital American interest. It's either democracy or many future Osama bin Ladens striking against U.S. interests. �

I admit some liberals took longer to overcome the Arab-Islamic taboo against approving foreign intervention. This is increasingly behind us. Yet, what Iraq proved was that the U.S. could not do the job alone. Internal democratic forces had to be mobilized. We are part of this "internal" process. I should add that outside intervention should not only be military. Ideally, we would like something like the Helsinki Accords, where the international community's relations with the Arab world involve spreading democracy, defending Arab dissidents, human rights, women's rights and minority rights. Syrian dissidents have been calling for this for years. Last year, Metransparent circulated a petition asking the United Nations to create an International Court to judge the authors of fatwas condemning people to death. �

reason: If you had to cite in one sentence the major challenge for Arab liberals in the coming year, what would it be?

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Akel: Managing relations with the Islamists. They are the liberals' adversaries but also, in certain cases, their necessary partners. To take an example from a completely different context: In the 1980s, French President François Mitterrand co-opted the French Communist Party and accelerated its implosion. Saad Eddine Ibrahim in Egypt and Riad Turk in Syria are wagering on a similar development in the Middle East. You bring Islamists into the open, encourage them to take part in the political life of a country, and they are bound to disintegrate into their various component elements. For example, the leader of the Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, Ali Sadruddin al-Bayanouni, recently opted for peaceful negotiations with Israel and even for a possible recognition of Israel. This would not go down well with other Syrian Islamists. Dissension shall occur over issues like this one and others. It is either this or the Assad and Mubarak regimes will last for a long time. The same applies tto Hamas. Co-opting Islamists is a risky proposal, of course. Where liberals should never make concessions is where Islamists tend to be harshest: the status of women. In that domain no concessions must be made. �

Man of the Mountain

myoung@reason.com (Michael Young) — Thu, 12 Jan 2006 00:00:00 EST

Iran weighs heavily on Walid Jumblatt's mind these days, as the paramount leader of Lebanon's Druze community answers questions in his mountain palace at Mukhtara, which he rarely leaves these days, fearing assassination by Syria. "In two weeks' time, [Iranian President Mahmoud] Ahmadinejad is going to Damascus to sign a defense cooperation agreement," he told me. "Neocons are no longer in power in Washington, but you can find them in Tehran."

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Jumblatt has gone through several incarnations in recent months, as Lebanon seeks to break free from 29 years of hegemony imposed by Syria, following the Syrian military withdrawal from the country last April. He initially led opposition to the Syrians after the killing of Rafik Hariri on February 14, but Jumblatt was also instrumental in later cutting a deal with two pro-Syrian Shiite groups, Hezbollah and Amal, to protect their quota in parliamentary elections during the summer. This about-face earned him the hostility of many Christians, who felt the deal was directed against them. That is, until Jumblatt's latest turnaround, where he broke with Hezbollah, accusing it of supporting Syrian aims in Lebanon. This followed the assassination last month of journalist and parliamentarian Gebran Tueni, where it became clear to Jumblatt that no understanding was possible with the Syrian regime—though he might conceivably have considered a good one had it been offered.��

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Jumblatt's binoculars perpetually sweep the region's political horizon to see what distant tremor might threaten his tiny 200,000-strong community—and his authority over it. This makes the Druze leader an insightful interpreter of the fluctuations in Middle Eastern politics—particularly issues of interest to the United States, such as Iranian-Syrian relations, Saudi-Egyptian maneuverings to save the Syrian regime, and the future of Hezbollah.

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Jumblatt's nightmare is that Syria will succeed in re-imposing its control over Lebanon, with Arab endorsement. Apart from what this would mean for Lebanon's newfound freedom, it would sound the death knell for Jumblatt. On the day we met, he was worried about a Saudi-Egyptian plan plainly designed to guarantee that the Hariri investigation would not undermine Syrian President Bashar Assad's regime. Why, I asked, had the Saudis altered course on Syria? After all, a week ago the former Syrian vice-president, Abdel-Halim Khaddam, appeared on the Saudi-owned Al-Arabiya station lambasting Assad; a few days later, Saudi-owned media spiked several interviews with Khaddam, and Al-Arabiya cancelled a one-on-one with Jumblatt.

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"Bashar seems to have blackmailed the Saudis and Egyptians. He seems to have said 'It's either me or the Muslim Brotherhood' to the Egyptians; and he may have scared the Saudis by threatening them with Al-Qaeda, which he happens to be backing in Iraq."

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Were there other explanations for the sudden Saudi shift in direction? "There may be differences of opinion in the royal family," Jumblatt answered. He speculated that the foreign minister, Saud Al-Faysal, for decades the avatar of status-quo Arab politics, may be keener to sustain the Assad regime than another Saudi mediator with Damascus, Bandar bin Sultan, the former ambassador to the U.S. who now heads the kingdom's National Security Council.

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Jumblatt affirmed that the Saudi-Egyptian plan—which seeks to impose vaguely-defined "coordination" between Lebanon and Syria on a variety of bilateral issues, and to muzzle Lebanese media when it comes to matters Syrian—had "failed." For Jumblatt, "implementation of such a plan would take us back to where we were with the Syrians before they left."

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Why had the plan failed? "Because both [U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza] Rice and [French President Jacques] Chirac have rejected any plan that might weaken Lebanon's sovereignty." Indeed, Rice released a statement on Wednesday saying: "The United States stands firmly with the people of Lebanon in rejecting any deals or compromises that would undermine the [Hariri] investigation, or relieve Syria of its obligations under U.N. Security Council resolutions... As Resolution 1559 demands, Syria must once and for all end its interference in the internal affairs of Lebanon."

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Though Jumblatt helped torpedo the Saudi-Egyptian initiative, he seemed little reassured that the Arab states would not again seek to save Assad's bacon. For him, however, one way to undermine such efforts is to create an international tribunal "that alone would have the power to call in suspects involved in Hariri's assassination, like Bashar Assad." Jumblatt makes no bones about the fact that the Syrians ordered the murder. "The only problem with such a tribunal," he conceded, "is that it takes time." Plenty of time for assassinations in Lebanon to continue.

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Did Jumblatt believe the Americans were sincere in pushing for a thorough investigation of the Hariri murder and an end to bombings in Lebanon? "They keep telling us there is no deal [with Syria]. But Syria is not being put under serious pressure," he answered, insisting that the latest U.N. resolution on the Hariri investigation was not as strong as it should have been.

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The U.N. investigation is mandated by the Security Council. I asked Jumblatt, knowing his close ties with the former Soviet Union, whether he didn't fear a breakdown of the consensus in the council because of Russia's refusal, along with China's, to sanction Syria."Yes, there are those in the Russian Foreign Ministry and the army who defend Syria, and the Russians have received gas exploration contracts from Syria." Jumblatt also expressed skepticism that the investigating commission would soon ask the Syrian authorities to arrest Syrian suspects, as the former head of the commission, Detlev Mehlis, told me it would over a month ago: "I've heard this again and again; I will believe it when I see it," said Jumblatt, with a trace of exasperation.

The Iranian relationship with Hezbollah is also of great concern to Jumblatt, because Hezbollah is closely allied with Syria, is heavily armed, and because the Druze leader doesn't believe the Lebanese government can persuade the party to disarm. According to Resolution 1559—the September 2004 Security Council decision demanding a Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon—Hezbollah and other militias in the country must surrender their weapons. However, Hezbollah's arms are there partly to help Iran. The group reportedly has thousands of rockets in southern Lebanon targeted at Israel, to deter an Israeli attack against Iranian nuclear facilities. "According to what I have heard [from within the Shiite community], the Iranian side in Hezbollah has gained ascendancy over the Syrian side," Jumblatt said. An Iranian-Syrian defense treaty would only bolster the group, making it more intransigent.

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Jumblatt saw Iran as becoming much stronger in the Middle East, thanks in large part to the Bush administration's weakening of its historical geopolitical rival, Iraq. "Iran is going to have the bomb. And when they do, the Arab world is finished." The Iranians are unsettling, he warned, because "they're very patient. You know, those who weave carpets are very patient."

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Jumblatt was recently taken to task in Lebanon for telling David Ignatius of the Washington Post: "[The U.S.] came to Iraq in the name of majority rule. You can do the same thing in Syria." One prominent left-wing Lebanese journalist wrote that Jumblatt was endorsing an American invasion of Syria, where the majority is Sunni Muslim, unlike Iraq, with its Shiite majority. "Yes, I said it," Jumblatt admitted; "Why be hypocritical? The Shiites in Iraq expanded their power under the American occupation; but here in Lebanon Hezbollah continues to be opposed to the U.S."

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He went on to observe that in the back of the minds of some in Syria's ruling minority Alawite regime, the idea of an alliance between Alawites and Lebanese Shiites and Christians to confront the region's majority Sunnis was still alive. I asked, half seriously, why the Druze had been left out of the equation. "The poor Druze, the poor Druze," Jumblatt muttered.

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For Jumblatt, Hezbollah is, dangerously, a "state within a state." Where can its refusal to disarm lead? "Perhaps to the situation prevailing in the late 1960s when the Palestinians began creating an autonomous 'Fatah-land' in southern Lebanon, from where they attacked Israel." Left unmentioned was that this state of affairs was a catalyst for Lebanon's civil war in 1975; though apparently recalling that his father was a prime supporter of the Palestinians, Jumblatt added: "At the time, Lebanese society was divided."�

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Jumblatt's pervasive pessimism, or realism, is sometimes an act, since the nonstop burden of impending doom is too much even for a man who has transacted and interacted with death since his late 20s. As if to prove that buoyancy still had its place, hours after the interview ended I received an 11:00 pm call from Jumblatt. "Did you read what the Americans said?" he asked, in reference to Rice's statement on Syria; "Pretty strong." He seemed happy. From his redoubt, he could see that the planets had momentarily aligned themselves in his favor—until they shift again and anxiety returns.��

No Premature Evacuation

myoung@reason.com (Michael Young) — Thu, 15 Dec 2005 00:00:00 EST

It might please Bush administration officials to know that twice during the funeral on Wednesday of slain Lebanese journalist Gebran Tueni, the United States was applauded: the first time when the ambassador in Beirut entered the church where the funeral service was to be held, the second while Tueni's coffin was accompanied by tens of thousands of chanting, angry mourners to the cemetery. With a bit of luck, this item might even find its way into Arabic newspapers courtesy of the Lincoln Group.

Writing in the Washington Post last Sunday, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice argued, "Supporting the growth of democratic institutions in all nations is not some moralistic flight of fancy; it is the only realistic response to our present challenges." In other words, global democracy is the ticket to greater American security. If any institution in the Middle East can be considered democratic, indeed Babel-like in its diversity, it is Tueni's newspaper, Al-Nahar. Though the publication has often been described as a staunch critic of Syria, it has also been a house of many mansions, publishing columnists friendly with the Syrians, others with much-too-comfortable access to Lebanese intelligence chiefs, luminous polemicists, liberal clerics, dispassionate analysts, dusty stenographers, gifted novelists, world-class poets, forgettable apparatchiks, and many more in a daily feast of broadsheeted contradiction.

In being open to everyone else's agenda, the newspaper paradoxically retained its own independence, ending up mostly serving the agenda of its owners, the Tuenis—Gebran, but also his father Ghassan, who turned Al-Nahar into a national institution starting half a century ago and who has just buried his third and last child. That's why Gebran's assassination on Monday was viewed as such a national calamity: Not only was an elegant, charismatic figure obliterated in an instant, the institution of Al-Nahar was seen to be existentially threatened.

There was never any doubt that Syria was behind his murder. There are those who will, out of sheer malice, demand that Bashar Assad's fingerprints be lifted from the detonation device before they can believe such a reckless accusation (what they fear most, of course, is finding themselves on the same side as the Bush administration). But Tueni knew who was after him, as did the foreign ambassadors who frequently warned about the dangers to his life. He had been threatened by the Syrians, several times even publicly, if deniably, in their official media. Much the same can be said of other Lebanese officials, politicians, and journalists who either have been killed, have left the country, or remain virtual prisoners in guarded residences to avoid liquidation.

Walid Jumblatt, the Druze leader at the epicenter of Syria's crosshairs, put it bluntly on Tuesday, telling Reuters: "Gebran Tueni and Al-Nahar were being threatened for a long time by the Syrian regime. ... We got the message. We will persevere." In an interview with CNN that same evening, he went further, calling Assad "sick" and accusing Syria, for the first time openly, of having murdered several prominent national figures, including Jumblatt's own father Kamal, President Rene Mouawad, and the Sunni Mufti Sheikh Hassan Khaled.

The Syrian regime today also stands accused of having ordered the February 14 assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. A United Nations investigation of the crime is moving forward, and on the day Tueni was killed, the German magistrate in charge of the inquiry, Detlev Mehlis, released his second report describing his team's progress. The Tueni killing was likely timed to coincide with the release.

Mehlis pointedly wrote that "the investigation has continued to develop multiple lines of enquiry which, if anything, reinforce [the] conclusions" of his first report. UN investigators had earlier found, among other things, "converging evidence pointing at both Lebanese and Syrian involvement in [the Hariri murder]"; and affirmed that "given the infiltration of Lebanese institutions and society by the Syrian and Lebanese services working in tandem, it would be difficult to envisage a scenario whereby such a complex assassination plot could have been carried out without their knowledge."

The relevance of all this may not be immediately obvious, though the fact that today Iraq is holding its second major election—and effectively its third countrywide referendum—in less than a year might help explain it. It's simply this: As Americans, no doubt legitimately, look forward to a drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq, their impatience shouldn't mean adopting an "after me, the deluge" attitude, because that would lead to open season being declared on the region's democrats—people like the Tuenis. In places like Iraq and Lebanon, as columnist David Ignatius wrote earlier this week, now is a time for assassins; "The shame for America isn't that we have tried to topple the rule of the assassins, but that we have so far been unsuccessful."

On the day after Tueni's death, Syria's ambassador to the United Nations, one Faysal Mekdad, proved how even the tedious functionaries of despotisms end up sounding like the thugs they represent. In a closed door session at the UN, Mekdad is said to have told another Arab ambassador, "So now every time that a dog dies in Beirut there will be an international investigation?" He was referring to the fact that the Lebanese government had, just the day before, requested that the UN investigation of the Hariri murder be expanded to include the dozen or so bomb explosions that have occurred since February, and that have killed not only Tueni, but also Samir Kassir, George Hawi, and several others, including three South Asian workers and an old man, and severely injured Lebanon's defense minister and a prominent television anchorwoman.

The Security Council might endorse the Lebanese proposal as soon as today, in a resolution supported by the U.S., France, and the United Kingdom—though Russia and China, never eager to tighten the screws on autocrats, oppose it. This resistance is worrying; a watered down or vetoed resolution could again undermine Lebanese efforts to investigate the crimes. Syrian intimidation and Syria's remaining allies in the Lebanese security services have helped delay previous efforts to uncover leads. The internationalization of Lebanese security when it comes to Syria, in the same way as the internationalization of security in Iraq (regardless of America's many blunders in the country), is essential to avoid a slide into something far worse.

That's not to say the U.S. should become fireman to the world. However, in those places where democrats have made headway, there may be a heavy price to pay for unreserved abandonment. As Rice observed about the Middle East: "When the citizens of this region cannot advance their interests and redress their grievances through an open political process, they retreat hopelessly into the shadows to be preyed upon by evil men with violent designs." Should this matter to Americans? One would have thought that 9/11 answered that question.

Reason contributing editor Michael Young is opinion editor at the Daily Star newspaper in Beirut.

Divided, Iraq Can Stand

myoung@reason.com (Michael Young) — Tue, 29 Nov 2005 00:00:00 EST

As the Bush administration faces increasing doubts about its performance in Iraq, its critics, spanning party lines, have sought ways to break the tedium of violence and redefine the American role in the country. On the Democratic side, Peter Galbraith has played a significant part in trying to shape a consensus, particularly in a series of articles in The New York Review of Books. A former ambassador to Croatia who was deeply involved later in East Timor, Galbraith first gained prominence on Iraqi issues as senior advisor to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee between 1979 and 1993. During that time he published reports on the Iran-Iraq war and on the Iraqi regime's brutal campaigns against the Kurds. Galbraith is currently writing a book on Iraq.

Reason: What do you think will happen next in Iraq, once the upcoming December elections take place on the basis of the new constitution?

Peter Galbraith: The results of the December elections are likely to resemble the January elections. The peoples of Iraq will vote their ethnic or confessional identity, and few will vote as Iraqis. The Kurds will vote once again almost unanimously for the Kurdistan list and the Shiites will vote for the religious parties. Last January, the Sunni Arabs expressed their identity by not voting, which many now realize was a mistake. They will now vote for Sunni parties, and especially those linked to the old Sunni-dominated regime.

At the same time, former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi and Ahmad Chalabi will get votes from secular Arabs, and perhaps some religious Shiites disappointed with the weak performance of the current government. Allawi, Chalabi, and the Communists have the only parties that are Iraqi—in the sense of crossing the Sunni-Shiite divide—and, even so, they don't have any support in Kurdistan.

Reason: As someone who has argued in favor of allowing Iraq's three main groups—Arab Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds—to go their separate ways in a newly structured state, do you feel the new constitution will allow this to happen peacefully, or will it lead to a violent breakdown, perhaps in the manner of Bosnia?

Galbraith: If Iraq breaks up, it will not be because of the new constitution, which merely acknowledges a breakup that has already taken place, and provides a structure for Iraq's peoples to coexist. I think the constitution can help avoid a Bosnia-type war because it resolves many of the issues—control of oil, the future of Kirkuk, power at the center—that could trigger a civil war. Iraq's peoples do not share common values, or even a desire to be in the same state. This constitution allows the Kurds to be secular and Western oriented, and the Shiites to have a pro-Iranian Islamic regime in the south. This is the only way to reconcile such disparate agendas within a single democratic state. But, if Iraq does break up, the constitution's loose federalism could make the process relatively painless.

Reason: There have been many theories on how to absorb the Sunni insurgency. In the context of the growing mood of decentralization in Iraq, do you feel a new central government has the capacity to act decisively on this front?

Galbraith: The Sunni insurgency can only be defeated by the Sunni Arabs. The constitution allows them to form their own region and have their own military. A Sunni Arab regional government and regional military may be able to win enough support to take on, or co-opt, many of the insurgents. An Iraqi Army loyal to a pro-Iranian Shiite government (and led by Shiites and Kurds) will never be seen as a national army by the Sunni Arabs.

Reason: In recent weeks there have been moves in the United States to impose a withdrawal timetable on the administration. The pressure to reduce troops is growing. Where do you think these dynamics are leading, particularly as we approach the November 2006 U.S. elections?

Galbraith: The American people have lost confidence in President Bush and his administration's conduct of the Iraq war, and for good reason. It has been the most incompetently executed major U.S. foreign policy undertaking of my lifetime. The pressure for withdrawal will only grow, and may become a tidal wave by next November.

Reason: You've been close to, or advising, Iraq's Kurds for some time. Some would say that makes you biased when it comes to Kurdish autonomy, or even independence, at the expense of recreating a unified Iraqi entity. How would you respond to that?

Galbraith: I have great sympathy for the Kurdish people who have suffered horribly under Iraqi rule. But my analysis is based on the strategic interests of the United States. Every Kurd wants independence, and keeping the Kurds in Iraq against their will is a formula for never-ending violence and repression. A unitary Iraq is unstable and unachievable; a loose federation may work. But, if not, the U.S. should work for a peaceful separation.

Reason: Some say there already is a victor in Iraq, and that's Iran. Do you agree, and how far can Iran go in Iraq without provoking an Iraqi backlash?

Galbraith: The Bush administration removed Iran's arch enemy, Saddam Hussein, and installed Iran's allies in power in Baghdad. The most powerful political party in Iraq is the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), and it was formed in Iran. Iran created, armed and trained the Badr Corps, the armed wing of the SCIRI, which is the most powerful armed force in southern Iraq, and which has infiltrated the police and army. No wonder the Iranians are gloating.

Reason: Do you feel that an American and Iraqi escalation on the border with Syria is now inevitable, particularly in light of Syria's growing international isolation because of the United Nations probe into the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri?

Galbraith: Syria did not want the U.S. to succeed in Iraq for fear that Damascus would be the next American target. Until things started to go so badly in Iraq, there were people associated with the Bush administration talking openly about "doing Syria next." But, the stakes have gone up since the Hariri assassination. If Syria continues to allow terrorists to cross its border into Iraq, it is taking a terrible risk.

Reason: Do you feel the U.S. and Iraq might use Syria's Kurds against Damascus as a means of pressure in the future?

Galbraith: No.

Reason: How will Turkey react to growing Kurdish autonomy, particularly if the U.S. pulls out and effectively lifts its protection from the Kurds?

Galbraith: Turkey's policy toward Iraqi Kurdistan so far has been realistic and forward-looking. Iraq's constitution creates a fully self-governing Kurdistan and includes a procedure to resolve the status of Kirkuk. Turkey accepts that it is the sovereign right of Iraq to organize itself as the peoples of Iraq choose. Turkey has chosen—very wisely in my view—to work closely with the Kurdistan Regional Government. It has also promoted Turkish business in Kurdistan, including a Turkish company that is developing the Taq Taq oil field under a contract with the Kurdistan Regional Government.

Even Turkish hardliners recognize that Ankara has few alternatives. There is no military option. A Turkish intervention in northern Iraq would be much more difficult than its domestic 15-year war fought against the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), and would lead to international condemnation and possible sanctions. An intervention in Iraq would also kill Turkey's chances of joining the European Union. Many in Turkey now see Kurdistan as a kindred state—sharing Turkey's secular traditions and its Western and democratic orientation. Kurdistan is a buffer against an Islamic state in Arab Iraq. And, Turkey's policy of building close ties with the Kurdistan government gives it much more influence than a policy based on threats.

Reason: Among Democrats, you're listened to as a voice on Iraq policy; what are you advising decision-makers in the party?

Galbraith: The Democrats need to present a clear alternative to Bush's failed policy, and not just criticize. The Bush strategy in Iraq is based on illusions and wishes; the Democratic strategy should be realistic. The starting point is recognizing that Iraq has broken up, and then working with the constituent components. Both Kurdistan and Iraq's south are stable, and there is no need for coalition forces to provide security in either place. The U.S. should reduce its footprint in the Sunni Arab areas and focus on developing a Sunni Arab force that is willing and able to take on the insurgents. Because of the danger that terrorists might use the Sunni areas to stage attacks outside Iraq, the U.S. cannot withdraw completely from the country. But, we can reduce our forces quickly, keeping a rapid-reaction force in Kurdistan which is the one place in Iraq where we are welcome. We also need to step up our diplomacy in working to resolve issues—like Kirkuk—that could intensify Iraq's civil war.

Reason: Is Iraq better off today than it was under Saddam Hussein?

Galbraith: Yes. It is important to remember how cruel Saddam's regime was. Because Iraq is now free, the violence is constantly in the news; but over the past 35 years Saddam's henchmen murdered more than 500,000 Iraqis, with the world knowing little about it and remaining, alas, largely indifferent.

Reason: Finally, do you have any confidence that the Arab states might find an independent solution to the Iraqi crisis? If not, where do the Arabs come into any solution?

Galbraith: Within Iraq, the reputation of the Arab world suffers from the past silence of Arab countries when Saddam Hussein slaughtered Shiites and Kurds. Many Shiites and Kurds believe the Arab League favors Sunni Arabs, and it will be hard for the Arab states to overcome this legacy of mistrust. The recent Cairo conference on reconciliation was, however, a good first step. Perhaps the most useful thing the Arab world could do is to train a Sunni Arab military force that can take on the insurgents and terrorists.

Reason contributing editor Michael Young is opinion editor at the Daily Star newspaper in Beirut.

Closing of the Democratic Mind

myoung@reason.com (Michael Young) — Thu, 17 Nov 2005 00:00:00 EST

The Bush administration has lost the initiative on Middle Eastern democratization. The gong of reality has apparently sounded. But just as some officials overestimated how democracy would impose sudden serenity on Iraq, those advocating a departure from democratization as a cornerstone of American foreign policy misjudge just how much the Arab world has changed since April 2003.

Things were different a year ago. In his second inaugural address, President George W. Bush issued an inventory of liberal promises: "We will encourage reform in other governments by making clear that success in our relations will require the decent treatment of their own people." (Applause.) "America's belief in human dignity will guide our policies. Yet rights must be more than the grudging concessions of dictators; they are secured by free dissent and the participation of the governed. In the long run, there is no justice without freedom, and there can be no human rights without human liberty." (Applause.) ... "Americans, of all people, should never be surprised by the power of our ideals. Eventually, the call of freedom comes to every mind and every soul. We do not accept the existence of permanent tyranny because we do not accept the possibility of permanent slavery." (Applause.) ... "Democratic reformers facing repression, prison, or exile can know: America sees you for who you are, the future leaders of your free country." And so on.

In a much publicized speech in Cairo last June, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice applied this idealism to the Middle East, saying: "For 60 years, my country, the United States, pursued stability at the expense of democracy in this region here in the Middle East—and we achieved neither. Now, we are taking a different course. We are supporting the democratic aspirations of all people."

Then the masonry began to collapse. With the administration facing growing domestic discontent over the war in Iraq (including, lately, from within the GOP) and a salvo of rotten fruit for its performance after hurricane Katrina, for nominating Harriet Miers to the Supreme Court, and for the Valerie Plame affair, the idealism began sounding more like the clang of an empty saucepan than an alarum rallying the liberal legions. On top of that, more urgent priorities elbowed their way to the top of the agenda.

Last weekend, for example, after failing at a summit in Bahrain to persuade Arab states to adopt a final statement promoting democracy, Rice traveled to Saudi Arabia, and there had to put democratic values on the backburner. The Americans and the Saudis effected a reconciliation of sorts, after deep differences over Iraq. The two sides set up joint working groups on terrorism, oil production, and the granting of U.S. visas to Saudi citizens, among other things. This harked back to the tradeoff that for decades ensured Washington would leave Arab despots alone: Whenever the U.S. has regarded security and economic self-interest as paramount in the Middle East, democracy has lost out.

Similarly, last week's bombings in Amman will almost certainly make less likely American pressure on Jordan's King Abdullah to open up his police-run system. The monarch has cleverly sought to peddle the line that now is the time to let democracy flourish, but somehow that is unconvincing. Which Arab leader has ever increased the repressive powers of his security agencies, as the king intends to do through a tough anti-terrorism law currently being drafted, while also giving his society more freedom?

The bombings took place as interest began waning in Jeffrey Goldberg's much-talked-about profile of former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft. Regurgitating the tenets of "realism", Scowcroft, who served under President George H.W. Bush, expressed deep doubts about the administration's democratization efforts. Quite why the congenitally uninspired Scowcroft has been promoted to foreign policy sage is a mystery, though his close relationship with the president's father offers part of the answer. There is also the fact that realists, who had nothing to say after 9/11, have regained some credence as the administration falters in Iraq.

That's why Scowcroft was not alone: His former protégé, Richard Haass, currently the president of the Council on Foreign Relations, wrote an opinion piece in The New York Times last week outlining what he sees as the ideal foreign policy doctrine for the U.S. Haass affirmed that while democracy promotion was a legitimate policy goal, "to make it a doctrine is neither desirable nor practical." Before him, fellow realist Gideon Rose, managing editor of Foreign Affairs magazine, argued that "the Bush doctrine has collapsed, and the administration has consequently embraced realism, American foreign policy's perennial hangover cure." How had things changed? "In practice, the Bush administration has recently begun to pursue interests rather than ideals and conciliation rather than confrontation."

Rose's diagnosis was incomplete: The administration has always mixed interests and ideals, conciliation and confrontation, since no foreign policy can ever be conducted on the basis of one without the other. But he was indirectly right in another sense: When it comes to facing the dilemma of advancing democracy against interests in the Arab world, the administration has been willing to hold up odiously manipulated elections as proof of progress—for example the recent presidential election in Egypt or municipal elections in Saudi Arabia. In other words, the administration, perhaps reluctantly, has intermittently fallen back on an old realist trick of insisting things are better, providing counterfeit evidence of this, and turning to more important items of business.

Yet now is as good a time as ever for the U.S. to make democratization a basis of its foreign policy doctrine in the Middle East. Many Arabs have no patience for Bush. But the center of gravity in the region has decisively shifted in the direction of advancing liberty, as recent events have eroded the legitemacy of Arab leaders: three relatively free elections this year in Iraq (one of them forthcoming in December), another relatively free election in Lebanon after the country saw an end to Syrian occupation, and growing discontent with the fossilocracies in other parts of the region, particularly Egypt or Tunisia, and with second-generation despotisms, such as those in Syria and Jordan. For an administration to ignore such changes and banish democracy to a secondary tier of priorities would display a striking lack of ambition and foresight.

A more obvious parallel question is whether the U.S. can even return to the cold realism that guided policy under the first Bush administration. As 9/11 showed, that approach posed a genuine national security threat, as disgruntled Arabs, associating Washington with their own domestic persecutors, retaliated against the U.S. Conversely, absolute, inflexible devotion to democracy at the expense of more practical consideration of interests is simply not sensible.

That leaves a third option: that the U.S. declare the spread of democracy a strategic interest (not an open-ended desire), one that must be advanced where and when possible, even if it is temporarily delayed by intervening objectives. Arab regimes should be pushed to take specific measures within specific timeframes to open up their societies, and the U.S. can tie this to other forms of bilateral cooperation. Finally, no administration should ever hail as progress what is patently an effort by dictatorships to sell it a defective bill of democratic goods.

Is this certain to work? No, but any policymaker wanting to adapt to the new realities in the Middle East is better off working according to these guidelines, rather than by playing down democratic principles and helping buttress the illegitimate, failing states that make a new 9/11 possible.

Reason contributing editor Michael Young is opinion editor at the Daily Star newspaper in Beirut.

Reason Express

info@reason.com (Jeff Taylor) — Tue, 15 Nov 2005 00:00:00 EST

In this issue:

1. Playing the Wrong Card
2. Viral IP Protection
3. Cue the Pitchforks and Torches
4. Quick Hits
5. New at Reason Online - Orange M é chanique
6. News and Events

1. Playing the Wrong Card

Chortle at the anchor man good looks, and recoil from the tort-bar animating power, but do not dismiss John Edwards' "I was wrong" gambit. If nothing else, America owes its eternal gratitude to the former senator for moving us off of the "Bush lied.—No he didn't.—Oh, yes he did.—No, he did not." Mobius strip that Iraq policy has circled for almost two years now.

Invading Iraq with the express purpose of toppling Saddam Hussein was a strategic mistake for the U.S.; there is simply no doubting that. But it is not a policy to say it was a mistake, just as George Bush's stubborn defense of the war is not a policy either. For Democrats to finally get traction on the war issue, they have to some alternative policy to offer apart from a Kerry-esque "consult with our allies" line, which is exactly where Edwards ended up after admitting he was wrong. In other words, he's still wrong there.

Why not try to get ahead of the game with regard to Syria and Iran and insist that the executive branch be much more forthcoming with regard to intelligence on those two countries? Each of them is clearly in the crosshairs of the Bush administration, and another wrong move could prove very costly.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/11/AR2005111101623.html

Reason Express is made possible by a grant from GlobalDrive, the world leader in globally-accessible data storage. Want to share files with co-workers or friends? Don't want to shlep your laptop to Europe? Worried about a safe place to store your computer's backups? Give GlobalDrive a try! Privacy. Protection. Security. Sharable. And from only $40/year.

2. Viral IP Protection

Sony may have managed to hasten the death of the CD format with its clumsy inclusion of a Trojan horse "copyright protection" program on its music CDs. The malware installed itself without notifying the user and created a security hole through which hackers could take over a machine. As a rule, it's not a good business practice to sell a product that secretly cracks open another piece of property for thieves and scammers to get at.

Record labels simply never accepted the fact that music files are very easy to manipulate with a general purpose device like a PC when those files are in an understandable, digital form. The various copyright protection schemes try to obscure those files from the machine—and the user—essentially building a machine within a machine that only the record company controls.

That approach is dangerous and likely doomed to failure, all the while throwing off ill will and bad vibes that all the marketing in the world cannot counteract.

http://www.freep.com/money/tech/bits14e_20051114.htm

3. Cue the Pitchforks and Torches

The oldsters should be rioting over Medicare Part D right about...now. What was billed as a government fix for the high cost of prescription drugs has predictably morphed into a complex government program that may or may not save the average recipient all that much money but will surely drive up costs for everyone in terms of anxiety, angst, and confusion.

Quick what is TROOP? The "doughnut hole"? Are you better off with a high premium and lower co-pays, or the reverse? Live in a big metro area with lotsa Zip codes close together? Don't be offended if the plan you want to sign up for is offered in nearby Zips but not in yours. And so on.

The drug benefit was supposed to relieve seniors of paying for drugs, which many sensibly interpreted to mean "free drugs," i.e. no out-of-pocket cost. But Part D is all about gaming out-of-pocket costs so that the truly catastrophic cases can be paid for. In other words, it tries to function like an insurance program. But the seniors had health insurance; what they wanted was free drugs. That's them marching through the village right now.

http://www.suntimes.com/output/currency/cst-fin-terry14.html

4. Quick Hits

Quote of the Week

"I'd like to say to the good citizens of Dover: If there is a disaster in your area, don't turn to God, you just rejected Him from your city. And don't wonder why He hasn't helped you when problems begin, if they begin. I'm not saying they will, but if they do, just remember, you just voted God out of your city. And if that's the case, don't ask for His help because he might not be there." —Televangelist Pat Robertson to the citizens of a Pennsylvania town who voted an "intelligent design" school board out of office.

http://www.leadingthecharge.com/stories/news-0099034.html

Bombers All Look the Same

It might be too easy to assume that American forces in Iraq last year briefly detained one of the suspected suicide bombers who struck Amman, Jordan, last week. May have been the same guy, maybe not.

http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=1310560

AIDS-Free Brit

A British man may have a natural immunity to AIDS, or his test results might've gotten mixed up with someone else's. Big difference, you know.

http://www.cbc.ca/storyview/MSN/world/national/2005/11/14/aids-cure-051114.html

IKEA or Die

A new IKEA store in Massachusetts has people driving over lawns to get to the store so they can get a head start on putting their furniture together.

http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2005/11/14/traffic_jamming_ikeas_neighbors?mode=PF

5. New at Reason Online

Orange Méchanique
What twentieth-century novel was the leading indicator of the French riots? Tim Cavanaugh

One Democracy, Hold the Invasions
Palestine, not Iraq, is the best shot at an Arab democracy. Jonathan Rauch

Arnold Agonistes
Gov. Schwarzenegger's political future may be over; as a cultural force, he'll be back. Nick Gillespie

And much more!

6. News and Events

An Evening with Milton and Rose Friedman

Please join the The Milton and Rose D. Friedman Foundation in celebrating 50 Years of an Idea. This 50th Anniversary Gala Dinner on December 5, 2005 at the Regent Beverly Wilshire in Los Angeles, California will honor Nobel Laureate Milton Friedman, who first proposed the school voucher idea in 1955.

The Friedmans will participate in a Q&A session, answering questions submitted by the audience. The Friedman's will be joined by several honored guests, who will be announced in the coming weeks. For more information on the dinner and how to attend, visit here.

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Reason Express

info@reason.com (Jeff Taylor) — Tue, 25 Oct 2005 00:00:00 EDT

In this issue:

1. Miers and Miers to Go
2. Rice and a Hard Place
3. Bush Batting .500 on Nominees
4. Quick Hits
5. New at Reason Online - The Root of the Problem
6. News and Events

1. Miers and Miers to Go

The Harriet Miers nomination is in deep trouble, and the only people who deny it work for the Bush White House. Crucially, the informal visits that Miers has had with senators have not erased doubts about her, only deepened them. Accordingly, it would be a great surprise if she ever goes before the Senate Judiciary Committee on November 7.

Senators are all but sending up flares to the White House to pull Miers by floating the prospect of calling Focus on the Family founder James Dobson before the committee to talk about what he knows about Miers' views on abortion. The chances of that ending well for the Bush White House, or the country for that matter, are slim and none.

Below the water line remain treacherous rocks of constitutional law that Miers does not seem to be the least bit conversant in. The nominee managed to get into a disagreement with prickly committee chairman Arlen Specter (R-Pa.) on whether she supported the decision in Griswold v. Connecticut, the landmark 1965 right to privacy case. Specter claims she said that she did; Miers denies it. It is certainly possible to craft a reasonable opposition to how Griswold was decided, but Miers' apparent confusion on it speaks to her lack of depth on these very big issues. A disaster awaits.

http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2005/10/24/MNG2BFD1UR1.DTL

2. Rice and a Hard Place

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice is clearly pressing for something to happen to Syria now that a U.N. report has implicated top Syrian officials the assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Hariri. Exactly what that "response from the international system" will be remains up for grabs.

President Bush wants to put the matter before the U.N. Security Council, which sounds like the path to sanctions on Syria. The French, for one, want to put that off for as long as possible, clearly hoping for President Bashar Assad to find some graceful way out of power without U.N. action.

But Assad has called out street protests to condemn the U.N. report and is generally striking a defiant tone at home as he seems to pursue some sort of diplomatic understanding with the U.S. on Lebanon and no doubt on better policing of the Syrian-Iraq border. That my not be enough, however, for Bush policy makers who want nothing less than regime change in Syria.

http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20051023/wl_afp/usunsyrialebanonrice_051023205551

3. Bush Batting .500 on Nominees

That was a relief rally you saw on Wall Street immediately after President Bush announced Ben Bernanke as his pick to replace Federal Reserve chief Alan Greenspan in January. The Street wanted no surprises, and Bernanke, a former Fed governor who now serves as the head of Bush's Council of Economic Advisers, is about as expected a pick as possible.

There was some sentiment to come up with a Fed chief with a less academic background and more of a day-to-day appreciation of the particular fears at work in the high-powered financial sector, but there was also nothing like consensus on who such a person might be. Chalk that up as another Wall Street neurosis.

Bernanke does have the experience of seeing how the Fed chairman operates up close, which should be a great help to him. Still, he will have to get into the habit of parsing his words extremely carefully as he moves into a job where the wrong head tilt or inflection can make or lose millions.

http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/business/1310AP_Bernanke_Profile.html

4. Quick Hits

Quote of the Week

"You're the English guy. I've seen you on TV and they said you were from England. He's Mr. England" —Joyce Delahoussaye introducing British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw to her son, Randy, during Straw's visit to Alabama.

http://today.reuters.com/news/newsArticle.aspx?type=politicsNews&storyID=2005-10-23T232250Z_01_KRA384104_RTRUKOC_0_US-BRITAIN-USA.xml

iLitigate

A lawsuit charges that Apple knew its iPod Nano was susceptible to scratching but chose to ship the product anyway. And consumers couldn't figure that out after one look at the Nano?

http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/10/24/apple_sued_over_nano/

God-given Right to TV

Sen. Ted Stevens (R-Alaska) wants to spend $3 billion to pay for converter boxes for older TV sets so they will still work after broadcasters switch to digital signals. It's in the Bill of Rights, you know.

http://money.cnn.com/2005/10/21/technology/digital_tv.reut/

Count on Body Counts

The Pentagon may not have officially ordered it, but units in Iraq had to turn to some kind of enemy body count metric to try to give meaning to repeated sweeps of the same town and villages.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/23/AR2005102301273.html

5. New at Reason Online

The Root of the Problem
The what's missing in the debate over U.S. vs. U.N. control of the Net. Julian Sanchez

Puddle Jumpers in the Great Lakes State
The EPA's twenty-year war to make everything a wetland. Shikha Dalmia

A Traditional Gay Wedding
At a same-sex ceremony, the new is made old again. Jonathan Rauch

And much more!

6. News and Events

Reason in Vegas!

Come to Las Vegas November 4-6

Join Drew Carey, Christopher Hitchens, author Joel Kotkin, Reason Editor-in-Chief Nick Gillespie, Reason Co-founder Robert Poole, and many other speakers for a weekend of fun and ideas in Las Vegas. Reason's Dynamic Cities Conference and Reason After Dark will feature Director John Stagliano's award-winning Fashionistas dance show, the spectacular Penn & Teller, panel discussions on topics ranging from eminent domain abuse to the government's war on pleasure, and much more.

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An Evening with Milton and Rose Friedman

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A Swift Kick in the Assad

myoung@reason.com (Michael Young) — Thu, 20 Oct 2005 00:00:00 EDT

In Kazuo Ishiguro's dreamlike novel When We Were Orphans, the main character, a British detective who never quite outgrew his childhood, travels to Shanghai to solve the mystery of his parents' separate disappearances, decades after they occurred. In the detective's mind, the resolution of his investigation takes on a transcendental quality: He imagines that the city's inhabitants (it is the late 1930s) see this as the event that will save them as China descends into war with Japan. Absurdly, the detective assumes that truth is the key to a rediscovered idyllic order.

Much the same attitude has prevailed in Lebanon in the period before Detlev Mehlis of presents his report on the assassination of Rafik Hariri to United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan. But the truth, while necessary and desirable, will hardly be a basis for renewed serenity. The Mehlis report, which will be delivered to Annan later today, will help bring about a denouement to the Hariri assassination, but no one should soon expect order in Lebanon or the region, particularly if the United States sees its conclusions as another reason to strike at Syria.

What will Mehlis say? The latest round of speculation, quoting Lebanese judicial sources, suggests he will publish "the names of suspects in security posts, former politicians and civilians," and that this will include the names of Syrian officers. The information seems to square with a statement last week by an unidentified Arab diplomatic official, who told the daily Al-Hayat that the report would "not include final results that are 100 percent conclusive," but that it would reveal that Hariri's assassination was planned months in advance and "was institutional, not the act of an individual." Mehlis, the source continued, would also direct accusations against members of the Syrian intelligence services, and would conclude that "orders came from a high level." If one believes Germany's Stern magazine this week, Syrian President Bashar Assad's brother-in-law Assef Shawkat will be named as a suspect, as will Syria's former intelligence chief in Lebanon, Rustom Ghazaleh.

The claims have been contradicted by some Lebanese press reports, citing unidentified U.N. sources, suggesting that while Syria will be blamed, Mehlis will not name specific officials. If true, that's probably because the Syrian regime did not collaborate adequately with his investigation, something the German prosecutor is expected to mention. His writ is to prepare a legal accusation for Lebanon's judiciary, and the standard he is apparently seeking to meet is that the evidence holds up in a German court. Mehlis may ask that Syrians be interrogated outside Syria for a subsequent trial, and his investigators are expected to remain on hand for a month or so longer to help the Lebanese judiciary in its efforts.

What must we look out for? First of all, the type of tribunal that emerges to judge the suspects. Lebanon favors an international court, but there is apparently little enthusiasm for that at the U.N. Last August, in an interim report, Mehlis informed his headquarters that the Lebanese had little confidence in their country's judiciary. This implied that a solely Lebanese trial would be a problem, whose success Syrian involvement in Hariri's murder would make all the more unlikely, given the possibility that Syria could intimidate Lebanon. This has led to an assumption that the most probable outcome will be the establishment of a mixed international-Lebanese court.

Beyond Lebanon, however, all eyes will be turned to the United States to see how it will react to Mehlis' findings. Last week, The Times of London reported that the Bush administration had offered a deal to Assad "a la Libya": Syria could avoid isolation in exchange for onerous concessions, including surrendering guilty officials accused by Mehlis, and ending its destabilization of Iraq and Lebanon and its support for Palestinian groups opposed to a settlement with Israel. The Syrians denied accepting this. The conditions appeared to have been leaked by the U.S. ambassador to the U.N., John Bolton, to scuttle any understanding.

Whether such a deal was serious or not, the Mehlis report will effectively lead to efforts for its implementation. In other words, if the Syrians are accused, the Bush administration and others in the international community will turn up the heat on Assad and demand the very concessions the "Libya redux" offer supposedly outlined. That's why The Times story was interesting but also, perhaps, irrelevant inasmuch as the American offer to Damascus was a splendid trap; its acceptance would have been suicidal; its rejection makes Syria look inflexible; and whatever happens, Assad will probably face hard times ahead because of Mehlis.

Whereas the Mehlis investigation imposed a partial gag order on politicking as the Bush administration and the international community awaited the results of the inquiry process, release of the report will change all that. On Wednesday, in an appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice refused to rule out the use of force against Syria because of its actions, particularly in Iraq. "The president never takes any option off the table and he shouldn't," Rice said.

For the first time, U.S. officials quoted in a New York Times story last week suggested that Syria had become like Cambodia during the Vietnam War: a sanctuary for those opposed to stability next door. The comparison was only partly accurate (foreign fighters are using Syria as an entry point into Iraq, and perhaps as a training ground, but Syria still very much controls the border area); it was also alarming in that American actions in Cambodia are hardly what the Bush administration should want to emulate: The Nixon administration ended up ordering an invasion in April 1970, helping push the formerly neutral country down the path to chaos.

For the moment, the Bush administration seems uncertain how far to push Assad. Earlier this year, a senior administration official dealing with the Middle East told me he did not believe the collapse of the Syrian regime would necessarily lead to an Islamist government. Nevertheless, according to columnist David Ignatius in his latest Washington Post piece, that confidence hasn't made things much clearer for American policymakers. He writes that the new director of national intelligence, John Negroponte, and his analysts at the National Intelligence Council, "have been warning [George W.] Bush that if Assad is toppled, the result isn't likely to be better in terms of regional stability, and it could well be worse." The analysts have argued "there isn't now any coherent, organized opposition to Assad."

That's true, though one should bear in mind that Assad's continued presence is no guarantee of stability either. His regime's international isolation, its negligible domestic support and its almost total inability to effect positive change today in Syria are sources of considerable volatility. What may ensue is a period of stalemate as everyone decides what to do next, with Syria simultaneously facing mounting pressure from the U.N. and the international community, perhaps even sanctions, because of Lebanon. The paradox of stalemate, however, is that it often leads to violence, as the parties seek to break the deadlock. That's why the aftershocks of the Mehlis report mean a bumpy road ahead in U.S.-Syrian relations, and why Americans may soon have to add Syria to their already cluttered Middle Eastern radar screens.

Realists, Schmealists

myoung@reason.com (Michael Young) — Fri, 23 Sep 2005 00:00:00 EDT

On Tuesday, Detlev Mehlis, who heads the United Nations team investigating the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, began traveling to Syria to interview present and former intelligence agents, as well as other Syrian officials. When Mehlis submits his final report in October, it will almost certainly contain bad news for Syrian President Bashar Assad. But that the UN's investigation has gotten this far at all reveals something about the haphazard nature of American foreign policy.

Syrian citizens are already alarmed about Mehlis' potential findings. They know the nature of their system is such that a major political killing could only have been ordered at the very top, leading to potentially stunning scenarios: that very senior Syrian officials, perhaps even Assad himself, may be implicated in Hariri's murder; that Assad may not be fingered directly, but will see the main supporters of his power accused; that all this may lead to the creation of an international tribunal, or a mixed Lebanese-international tribunal, to try the suspects. And, most importantly, that it may mean curtains for the Assad regime altogether.

In the U.S., whatever happens will be judged in the context of the Bush administration's predilection for evicting Middle Eastern despots. Assad, like Saddam Hussein, is someone Washington wants to be rid of. While American officials have stuck to the mantra that what they really seek is a change in Syrian behavior—in Iraq, Lebanon, on the Palestinian-Israeli front, even inside Syria—the reality is that the conditions they've imposed are so onerous, their acceptance so sure to discredit and destabilize Assad's rule, that the administration is effectively engaging in regime change that dares not speak its name.

However, this time, compared to Iraq, things are different. If the United States succeeds in ousting Assad (and even if it does not), it has adopted a strategy that is almost the exact opposite of the Iraqi one. In working through the United Nations Security Council (which in September 2004 adopted Resolution 1559 demanding a Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon), in coordinating closely with France and other allies, in avoiding the use of force and even UN sanctions, in feeding off mass democratic protests in Lebanon after Hariri's killing, and in backing a UN investigation into the assassination that might lead to the creation of some sort of international court—in doing all those things, the Bush administration has not only navigated well within the norms set by hardcore multilateralists and international law, it has participated in an almost ideal model of how the UN can alter state behavior without violence.

Still, ideal models usually have hitches. The administration's approach to Lebanon and Syria would almost certainly have failed had it been applied to Saddam. Without the U.S. military in Iraq, Syrian behavior would have been very different. Assad would not have made the mistakes he did, but also the Lebanese, rendered cynical by decades of general indifference to Syrian rule over their country, would not have believed in the likelihood of change when they took to the streets. Iraq, for all its problems, sparked a regional mood change, and the Lebanese fed off that.

But the U.S. in Iraq behaved so differently than in Lebanon that the fierce pie-throwing among realists, neoconservatives, left liberals, and libertarians turns out to be hollow theater: When it comes to the nitty-gritty of affairs, an administration, particularly one under duress, will pick up whatever political opening is readily available to advance an aim and run with it—dogma be damned.

The key difference is between broad goals and actual implementation. The mess in Iraq was one reason why the U.S. moved more cautiously in Lebanon; two others were that the administration was following the French lead there, not the contrary, and that Syria was vulnerable in ways Iraq was not. If there is a perennial fault in understanding what motivates the U.S., or anybody else, it is assuming the absoluteness of foreign policy doctrine and ignoring how reality muddles doctrine.

In an August New York Times op-ed, for example, Foreign Affairs managing editor Gideon Rose gloated that "the Bush doctrine has collapsed, so the administration has embraced realism, American foreign policy's perennial hangover cure." He defined realism as the pursuit of "interests rather than ideals and conciliation rather than confrontation." Yet Rose downplayed how past administrations, including those cited as realist paragons, almost invariably blended realism and idealism, conciliation and confrontation.

Much the same excess can be heard on the other side of the aisle, with left liberals in particular certain that the Bush administration is all about browbeating and scorn for alliances, particularly in the Middle East, even as many of them have ignored the administration's multilateral impulses in Lebanon and Syria.

The Bush doctrine hasn't collapsed in favor of realism, as Rose believes, nor has the administration embraced realism or consensual internationalism, as the aficionados of both those approaches would like. Instead, in a world where policy doctrine runs into unpredictable obstacles; where administrations, because they just can't find the cash, sometimes must impose change "on the cheap"; where foreign policy miscalculations or poor execution are more the norm than the exception—in such a world, dogmatism is not only a bad idea, it's nonsensical.

If Bashar Assad is forced out of office or decisively weakened thanks to the UN and Detlev Mehlis, American officials will congratulate themselves. The more honest ones will admit that their efforts merely fulfilled what was possible. To insist on absolutes and condemn administrations for failing to live up to them is to insist that politicians fulfill what is not possible.

Liberal Thought in the Arab Age

myoung@reason.com (Michael Young) — Thu, 08 Sep 2005 00:00:00 EDT

For the past 24 years Egyptians could have any president they wanted, as long as he was Hosni Mubarak. Every six years they were asked to vote for him, a single candidate, by referendum. However, on Wednesday, for the first time in its history, Egypt held a competitive presidential election, and sure enough, voters got more of Hosni Mubarak.

The Egyptian election raised interesting questions for Arab liberals, particularly those who insist that reform must be driven "from within," as opposed to being significantly advanced by a democratically aggressive West, in particular the United States. The pessimists argued that Mubarak's shameless manipulation of the election process, his government's decision to bar independent election monitors, his endeavor to use competitive voting to deny representation while winning the appearance of legitimacy, showed that Arab despots can be maliciously creative in exploiting and undermining democratic institutions.

The optimists responded that Mubarak, by opening up the electoral process, albeit selectively, also opened a democratic Pandora's Box that the regime won't be able to close in the long run. Institutionally, competitive presidential elections have become a reality, allowing candidates to emerge in the future more popular than the nine men who stood against Mubarak this time around, so that Egyptians will have a chance to challenge disliked incumbents. The Serbian model comes to mind, where Vojislav Kostunica managed to unseat Slobodan Milosevic after the autocratic Serbian president tried to deny him an election victory. In other words, while stilted election rules give an incumbent immense power, the regime has no antidote if an outraged public revolts.

There is truth in both arguments: Mubarak has indeed been a master of ersatz democracy, but had he been able to blithely continue with a referendum system, he probably would have done so. Yes, he won this election, but given that he will be 83 when his term ends (if he doesn't expire first), there is a higher probability that in a few years' time Egypt will have a fairer contest, wherein a regime candidate lacking the experience and clout to pull off an election swindle would be more vulnerable than Mubarak.

However, the larger question for reform-minded liberals in Egypt and throughout the Middle East is whether their efforts are not just a chronicle of a death foretold in arbitrary or nonexistent electoral climates—and whether they need to rethink their resistance to western efforts at regional democratic change.

Liberal skepticism is partly a function of the type and degree of intervention. Most people welcome, for example, international election monitors or sanctions directed against specific regime figures. However, beyond certain boundaries—for example imposing broad international sanctions (as occurred in Iraq during the 1990s), adopting assertive policies to isolate leaders, or using military force—liberals become uneasy with outside pressures, though these may be precisely what is needed for success.

There is little doubt that Mubarak agreed to a competitive presidential election at least partly because of the election in Iraq. He knew that domestic voters would wonder why, despite the daily violence, Iraqis were offered a choice, when Egyptians, who live in a more or less peaceful country, were not. Egyptian liberals have been among the most vociferous critics of the American occupation of Iraq. Yet if they benefit from the competitive election process, will they admit that this resulted to some extent from that occupation?

A major obstacle to their doing so is that Arab liberals, for example those in Egypt's bourgeois Wafd or Syria's National Bloc, have historically spearheaded anti-colonial struggles. The legacy of mistrust of Western intentions (often accompanied by near impossible demands for how Western states should resolve Arab problems) has not worn off, even as the world around the liberals has fundamentally changed. Opposition to the U.S. today is often spun as anti-colonialism, or anti-neocolonialism, but the colonial narrative is no longer as relevant as it once was.

A prominent book that tried to address the Western impact on the Arab world was first published in 1962 by an Oxford professor of Lebanese descent named Albert Hourani. In his classic Arab Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798–1939, Hourani examined the development of Arab ideas after the region's first modern-day encounter with the West: Napoleon's landing in Egypt at the end of the 18th century. Hourani's book is divided into three parts: The first, covering 1798–1870, examines how the West became a model of emulation for Arab thinkers keen to embrace "progress," ironically because they were on the losing side of Western progressivism; in the second part, Hourani describes how, during the last three decades of the 19th century, Arabs saw the West as both a reference point and adversary, as European imperial powers began occupying Arab territories; and finally, he looks at the period between 1900 and 1939, when Islam and secularism, which early reformers saw as compatible in the quest for modernity, grew apart, so that (moving beyond Hourani's narrative) nationalism and Islamism became bitter adversaries.

Implicit in Hourani's book is a notion that, for a long time, thinkers in the Arab world (or what preceded it under Ottoman rule) were relatively comfortable with Western ideas and institutions, and sought to square them with Arab and Islamic concepts of governance, jurisprudence, and more. While the osmosis was stunted by European imperialism, it never stopped, so that anti-imperialist leaders were also often Western-trained liberals. Hourani's book is generally positivist in its tone, though he is hardly a preacher for the superiority of Western values over Arab or Muslim ones. Hourani wrote about liberals like himself, persons personally or intellectually caught between two worlds, hoping for some kind of reconciliation. Ultimately he would fail, as Arab nationalist politics—increasingly defined by antipathy toward the West and, specifically, its political models—became radicalized in the post-Independence period.

One is tempted to describe those liberals like Hourani—the most pronounced victims of the Arab age of ideology—in the same way that Isaiah Berlin described Ivan Turgenev in his introduction to the novel Fathers and Sons: "It was his irony, his tolerant skepticism, his lack of passion, his 'velvet touch', above all his determination to avoid too definite a social or political commitment that, in the end, alienated both sides."

There is not much irony in Hourani's writings, but there is certainly among modern Arab liberals a discomfort with ideological absolutes, a tolerance for difference, that has made them palatable neither to Islamists nor to nationalist radicals. Accused by both sides of being lackeys of the West, Arab liberals have vainly sought to counter this charge by reaffirming their hostility to foreign hegemony. Yet this has earned them few new friends at home, even as it has prevented them from exploiting outside pressures that could be to their advantage. Liberals have generally been bludgeoned into silence by a combination of regime brutality and their own hang-ups, displayed by an incessant recitation of the colonialist narrative.

American mismanagement in Iraq has surely not helped. In Syria today, for example, it's fair to say that most of the population would be delighted to see the Assad regime disappear, but only if they could be assured that the aftermath wouldn't be a new Iraq. Syrian dissident Yassin al-Haj Saleh summed up the attitude well in a Reason interview: "Outside diplomatic and public pressure can be very useful, especially when it is multilateral—American, European and Arab. Change through invasion, as in Iraq, is destructive and counterproductive."

It is certainly destructive and counterproductive if the U.S. fails to stabilize a country after booting its regime out, but nothing short of war was ever going to remove Saddam Hussein, nor make him more amenable to the nudges of domestic reformers. Yet the liberals' natural dislike of force, their coyness when dealing with most forms of outside interference (despite a taste for usually ineffective aid provided to non-governmental organizations, around which many liberals gravitate), their ability to address the West on its own terms while simultaneously criticizing it, and their penchant for cultural ecumenism, which makes them, in the name of tolerance, sometimes overlook their societies' worst abuses—all these factors help ensure that liberals are often the worst prepared to take advantage of Western actions in their midst.

The use of force should always be a last resort, but even imposed democracy in one Arab society, no matter how imperfect, can be contagious, forcing other regimes to make choices they would prefer not to make. Mubarak had to react to Iraq's election, but it's also true that Kurdish fortunes in Iraq are why the Syrian government has promised its own Kurds it will address their long-neglected rights. The U.S. military presence on Syria's eastern border was an important reason among others why the Lebanese felt emboldened to demand that the Syrians leave their country after Rafik Hariri's murder. And that's only the beginning; if Iraqis agree to a federal structure dividing their country along sectarian and ethnic lines, for all the potential problems in that system, it will prompt other minorities in the region (for example Shiites in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain) to demand their rights.

All that will be the result of an American military venture. Iraq may have been flawed, its aftermath was surely mismanaged, and many Americans now want out; but even if one admits to the difficulties, the Middle East has been deeply changed nonetheless, and it's no thanks to its insecure liberals.