Reason Magazine - Staff

A Capitalist Peace?

info@reason.com (Doug Bandow) — Wed, 26 Oct 2005 00:00:00 EDT

President George W. Bush's foreign policy is predicated on the idea that spreading democracy will discourage war. But new research suggests that expanding free markets is a far more important factor, leading to what Columbia University's Erik Gartzke calls a "capitalist peace." It's a reason for even the left to support free markets.

The capitalist peace theory isn't new: Montesquieu and Adam Smith believed in it. Many of Britain's classical liberals, such as Richard Cobden, pushed free markets while opposing imperialism.

But World War I demonstrated that increased trade was not enough. The prospect of economic ruin did not prevent much of humanity from giving in to nationalism, ethnic hatred, and security fears, which combined to trump the power of markets.

In in the period following the two World Wars, war became essentially unthinkable among leading industrialized—and democratic—states. Support grew for the argument, going back to Immanual Kant, that republics are less warlike than other systems. Today's corollary is that creating democracies out of dictatorships will reduce conflict, an idea that animated some policymakers to support the invasion of Iraq.

But Gartzke argues that "the 'democratic peace' is a mirage created by the overlap between economic and political freedom." That is, democracies typically have freer economies than do authoritarian states. Thus, while "democracy is desirable for many reasons," he notes in a chapter in the latest volume of Economic Freedom of the World, created by an international group of think tanks, "representative governments are unlikely to contribute directly to international peace." Capitalism is by far the more important factor.

There are a number of reasons why economics appears to trump politics. The shift from statist mercantilism to high-tech capitalism has transformed the economics behind war. Markets generate economic opportunities that make war less desirable. Territorial aggrandizement no longer provides the best path to riches. Free-flowing capital markets and other aspects of globalization simultaneously draw nations together and raise the economic price of military conflict, because the political destabilization resulting from war deters profitable investment and trade. Moreover, sanctions, which interfere with economic prosperity, provides a coercive step short of war to achieve foreign policy ends.

These positive economic trends are not enough to prevent war, but then, neither is democracy. It long has been obvious that democracies are willing to fight—just usually not each other. Contends Gartzke, "liberal political systems, in and of themselves, have no impact on whether states fight."

In particular, poorer democracies perform like non-democracies. By his calculation, the correlation between economic liberty and peace is 50 times as great as that between democracy and peace. He explains: "Democracy does not have a measurable impact, while nations with very low levels of economic freedom are 14 times more prone to conflict than those with very high levels."

Gartzke considers other variables, including alliance memberships, nuclear deterrence, and regional differences. Although the causes of conflict vary, the relationship between economic liberty and peace remains.

His conclusion hasn't gone uncontested. R.J. Rummel, the author of several books and avid proponent of the democratic peace theory, challenges Gartzke's methodology and worries that it "may well lead intelligent and policy-wise analysts and commentators to draw the wrong conclusions about the importance of democratization."

Gartzke responds in detail, noting that he relied on the same data as most democratic peace theorists. If it is true that democratic states don't go to war, then it also is true that "states with advanced free market economies never go to war with each other, either."

The point is not that democracy is worthless. Free political systems naturally entail free elections. Other forms of liberty—civil and economic—are more likely to survive when politics also is free. But democracy alone doesn't yield peace. To believe is does is dangerous: There's no panacea for creating a conflict- free world.

That doesn't mean that nothing can be done. But promoting open international markets—that is, spreading capitalism—is the best means to encourage peace as well as prosperity. Notes Gartzke: "Warfare among developing nations will remain unaffected by the capitalist peace as long as the economies of many developing countries remain fettered by governmental control." Freeing those economies is critical.

It's a particularly important lesson for the anti-capitalist left. For the most part, the enemies of economic liberty also most stridently denounce war, often in near pacifist terms. Yet they oppose the very economic policies most likely to encourage peace.

If market critics don't realize the obvious economic and philosophical benefits of markets—prosperity and freedom—they should appreciate the unintended peace dividend. Trade encourages prosperity and stability; technological innovation reduces the financial value of conquest; globalization creates economic interdependence, increasing the cost of war.

Nothing is certain in life, and people are motivated by far more than economics. But it turns out that peace is good business. And capitalism is good for peace.

Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and co-editor of Perpetuating Poverty: The IMF, the World Bank, and the Developing World.

Foreign Policy Welfare Queen

info@reason.com (Doug Bandow) — Mon, 17 Oct 2005 00:00:00 EDT

The U.S. State Department has never met an alliance, treaty, or aid program that it doesn't like. As a result, the list of Washington's foreign policy welfare queens is long. The Republic of Korea, however, must be near the top.

In 1950 the U.S. rescued South Korea from an invasion from the North. Today Seoul has about 40 times the GDP, twice the population, and a vast technological edge over the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. But the South continues to rely on Washington for a defense arrangement that is expensive for America, unpopular in Korea, and unnecessary for both countries. After the June summit between Presidents George W. Bush and Roh Moo-hyun, President Bush opined: "We're strategic partners, allies and friends."

Delusions about South Korea's need for assistance infects Capitol Hill as well. This summer, Rep. Dan Burton (R-Ind.), vice chairman of the International Relations Committee's Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, sent a "Dear Colleague" letter to other House members extolling the U.S.-ROK alliance. "Forged in the heat of battle, the U.S.-South Korean bilateral relationship continues to be one of our most vital and vibrant partnerships," Burton declared. The congressman cited "the continuing contributions made by South Korea to our mutual alliance—some that are all too often forgotten."

Actually, they aren't worth remembering. For instance, Burton pointed to trade. But Americans and South Koreans trade because it is mutually beneficial to do so, not because of our military alliance. The ROK "has been a strong ally in the U.S.-led War on Terror, having committed more than 3,270 troops to Iraq," the congressman noted. What Burton didn't mention was that Seoul insisted its forces be placed far away from hostilities.

Another "contribution," in Burton's view, is that Seoul "has taken positive steps on the question of human rights in North Korea." But the ROK does not accept North Korean refugees as a favor to America. Moreover, Seoul has turned markedly frigid towards those fleeing North Korean tyranny. Government ministers have publicly denounced activists who organize mass defections and dis claimed any interest in undermining Pyongyang. South Korea seems more concerned about offending the DPRK officials doing the oppressing than the millions of people being oppressed.

Burton also contended that "South Korea is a key partner in the Six-Party Talks to resolve North Korea's nuclear issue." Actually, Seoul and Washington view the issue very differently. ROK Unification Minister Chung Dong-Young recently proclaimed that the North is entitled to have a nuclear program. South Korea has been closer to China than the U.S. in the six-party talks. Moreover, the South is providing substantial economic aid to North Korea without asking for much in return. ROK public opinion increasingly views the U.S. as a greater threat than the DPRK.

Nevertheless, Burton wrote, "South Korea is an important military ally with over 33,000 U.S. troops stationed in the country." But there's no justification for maintaining U.S. troops in the ROK. The South lost most of its strategic value to America after the Cold War. The U.S. garrison performs no useful regional role. If the United States ends up at war with China, we won't be launching a ground invasion. More important, the South Koreans are unlikely to allow the U.S. to use their nation as a launching pad. Earlier this year, President Roh emphasized that his nation would not get involved in a war in Northeast Asia at America's behest and that Washington could not use its troops based in the ROK without Seoul's permission.

There remains much that Americans and Koreans can do together. But maintaining a close military alliance is not one of them. It's time to focus on the interests of America rather than "allies" who believe Washington owes them a defense.

Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and a member of the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy. A former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan, he is co-author of The Korean Conundrum: America's Troubled Relations with North and South Korea (Macmillan/Palgrave).

Bring It On, and On, and On

info@reason.com (Doug Bandow) — Mon, 22 Aug 2005 00:00:00 EDT

President George W. Bush has launched a campaign to shore up flagging support for the occupation of Iraq. "Our troops," he intoned in his weekly radio address Saturday, are fighting "to protect their fellow Americans from a savage enemy." Indeed, he added, "if we do not confront these evil men abroad, we will have to face them one day in our own cities and streets." This continues a theme he laid out in Fort Bragg recently: "We fight today because terrorists want to attack our country and kill our citizens, and Iraq is where they are making their stand."

Unfortunately, the dual attacks in London last month clearly showed that the Iraq war has not reduced the terrorist threat.

Too many Americans and Iraqis already have died based on false claims about Saddam Hussein's supposed possession of WMDs and connection to 9/11. No one should die now under the illusion that we are fighting terrorists in Baghdad and Fallujah instead of New York and London.

Terrorists who kill and maim should themselves be killed or captured—whether they are operating in London, Baghdad, or New York. Which is why the administration's initial response to 9/11—targeting al-Qaeda and overthrowing the Taliban in Afghanistan—was entirely appropriate.

But battling terrorism should not mean fighting blind or basing policy on delusions. In general, terrorism is a violent tool in a political struggle, where one side is overmatched in conventional terms. Robert Pape, author of the new book, Dying to Win, reviewed 315 suicide bombing attacks between 1983 and 2003 and found that virtually all of them had "a specific secular and strategic goal: to compel democracies to withdraw military forces from the terrorists' national homeland."

There are undoubtedly jihadists who simply hate America and its freedoms. A few others might have wild ideas about reestablishing Islamic glory over Western lands. But the evidence suggests that most of the antagonism springs from hatred of U.S. (and allied) government policies.

For instance, before the London bombings a British intelligence assessment leaked to the press found that "events in Iraq are continuing to act as motivation and a focus of a range of terrorist-related activity." In a new report Britain's Chatham House observes that Iraq has given "a boost to the al-Qaeda network's propaganda, recruitment and fundraising."

The Israeli Global Research in International Affairs Center reported earlier this year that Iraq "has turned into a magnet for jihadi volunteers." But not established terrorists. Rather, explained report author Reuven Paz, "the vast majority of Arabs killed in Iraq have never taken part in any terrorist activity prior to their arrival in Iraq."

Larry Johnson, who served with both the CIA and the State Department's counterterrorism office, observes, "You now in Iraq have a recruiting ground in which jihadists, people who previously were not willing to go out and embrace the vision of bin Laden" are "now aligning themselves with elements that have declared allegiance to him."

The British government recently compiled an extensive report entitled "Young Muslims and Extremism," warning that British-U.S. policies are alienating many Muslims who see them "as having been acts against Islam." Analysts informed the prime minister that the Iraq war is acting as a "recruiting sergeant" for extremism.

"The battle experience that jihadists gain in Iraq," Paz adds, "supplies the Islamist adherents of the Global Jihad culture with a wealth of first-hand field experience." Larry Johnson worries that Iraqi insurgents are learning how to build bombs and run military operations.

Even more menacingly, after being trained in the ways of urban warfare, these terrorists are "bleeding out" around the world. Germany's Der Spiegel magazine reports that scores of Muslim extremists have returned to Europe from Iraq, and all "are equipped with fresh combat experience and filled with ideological indoctrination. It is these men who are considered particularly dangerous."

The ideology these men absorb is heavily colored by U.S. and British policies. Al-Qaeda's number two, Ayman Zawahiri, recently denounced "aggression against Muslims," ranging from war to support for corrupt regimes. Osama bin Laden's earlier phrasing was: "If you bomb our cities, we will bomb yours." Although condemning the London attacks, Hamas leader Mahmoud al-Zahar contended that Muslims have suffered "too much from the American aggression."

The point is not that their assessments are accurate or U.S. policies are unjustified. Nor should London and Washington precipitously retreat from Iraq and allow terrorist acts to determine national policy. But policymakers must recognize that intervention—particularly the prolonged intervention being planned for Iraq—vastly expands the pool of people willing to listen to, and follow, terrorist demagogues.

Observes Robert Pape: "Since suicide terrorism is mainly a response to foreign occupation and not Islamic fundamentalism, the use of heavy military force to transform Muslim societies over there, if you would, is only likely to increase the number of suicide terrorists coming at us... Suicide terrorism is not a supply-limited phenomenon where there are just a few hundred around the world willing to do it because they are religious fanatics. It is a demand-driven phenomenon."

The Iraq conflict has become a killing field. But not as war supporters expected. It is providing an opportunity for extremists to kill U.S. troops while learning skills that may eventually be employed in Western lands. Whatever the Iraq conflict is accomplishing, it is not making us safer from terrorism. Either President Bush should stop claiming this or we should stop listening to him.

Whose Fault?

info@reason.com (Doug Bandow) — Thu, 16 Sep 2004 00:00:00 EDT

American combat deaths in Iraq have climbed over 1000. The biggest barrier to President George W. Bush's reelection is the unnecessary war and botched occupation in Iraq. No convention acceptance speech, however eloquent, can change that reality.

Yet the President and his supporters have never accepted his responsibility. Rather, their mantra states, "It's the media's fault."

For instance, columnist David Limbaugh complains that " Democrats and the media have successfully created the perception that Iraq has been a disaster." Which, naturally, is the reason popular backing for the war is waning.

Move America Forward, created by former California Assemblyman Howard Kaloogian, is seeking to counter criticism of Bush. In an email fund-raising solicitation, Move America Forward's vice-chairwoman Melanie Morgan declared: "Recent national polls show that only 37%-42% of Americans now support the War in Iraq. It's not hard to figure out why. Every day we are bombarded with negatively biased reports from the news media."

Indeed, for more than a year Bush acolytes have circulated emails reporting "the good news that you aren't hearing" about Iraq, which cited the dredging of harbors, creation of regulatory agencies, and opening of schools. Never mind the deaths of one or more Americans every day; there were more important things happening over there, explained Rep. George Nethercutt (R-WA).

The failure to understand why the American people have turned against the war demonstrates that the administration and its allies are simultaneously arrogant and tone-deaf. While conservatives routinely denounced President Bill Clinton for failing to accept responsibility for his actions, the GOP now is taking the cult of the victim to new heights.

Why does the majority of Americans, many of them conservative in temperament and tending to vote Republican, now criticize the war? Start with the fact the war was based on a falsehood.

It was not a media creation that the administration painted Saddam Hussein as a modern Hitler, ready and able to devastate the U.S. Officials from the President on down spoke of mushroom clouds, millions at risk from bioterrorism, unmanned aerial vehicles that could hit America, and so on. "If we know that Saddam Hussein has dangerous weapons today—and we do," then we shouldn't wait to attack, stated the President.

None of those charges were true. The administration's failure to back up its lurid claims was not due to the media.

Despite the most disastrous intelligence failure in decades, the President took no action: he accepted no responsibility, held no official accountable, announced no review of intelligence procedures. Instead, Vice President Richard Cheney continued to suggest that Hussein was involved in 9/11, a charge for which there never was any evidence.

Once having conquered Iraq, the administration proceeded to bungle virtually every major decision. It was not the media's fault that officials falsely promised that Iraqis would shower U.S. troops with rose petals, the occupation would pay for itself, the garrison would fall to 30,000 by last summer, and the allies would fall over themselves to join the victorious bandwagon.

"Once we have victory in Baghdad, all the critics will look like fools," said Cheney. Not quite. And don't blame the media.

Journalists understandably concentrated on how Iraq's problems affected the U.S. There was positive news, of course. But far more important was the negative fact that a majority of Iraqis disliked Washington, wanted Americans to go home, and even justified attacks on U.S. forces.

It would be nice if Iraqis were grateful to America for their liberation. But the majority aren't. And that's not a media creation.

Nor can journalists be blamed for the fact that the administration's optimistic predictions of future progress always went unfulfilled. First the death of Hussein's sons would be the turning point.

Once he was captured all would be well, we were told. Then economic progress would change things. Finally, it would be the transfer in sovereignty.

Yet more American troops died in July after the turnover than in June. August was even worse, as the U.S. fought Shiites in Najaf. In just three days in early September 14 Americans died.

The story just gets worse. There's the administration's reliance on Iraqi exile Ahmed Chalabi, whose Iraqi National Congress helped lie America into war. Which was followed by Administration's abandonment of Chalabi in the midst of charges that he spied for Iran. That bizarre somersault wasn't the media's fault.

Despite the administration's eloquent rhetoric about democracy, the government of Iyad Allawi looks more authoritarian than liberal, like a house-broken Saddam Hussein. Ken Dilanian of the Philadelphia Inquirer once wrote of the understated good news. In early August he admitted that the situation was deteriorating badly: "Large swaths of the country that once were safe are now considered danger zones." Indeed, the U.S. military has largely abandoned entire cities within the so-called Sunni Triangle.

Christians are being brutalized and Christian churches are being bombed; 40,000 Christians have fled to Syria, an ugly anti- American dictatorship. Journalists aren't to blame for these problems.

Finally, after a year of building fantasies in the sky, the administration has become more circumspect. National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice says Americans should "be more patient" and "less critical of every twist and turn." After all, she acknowledged, "not everything has gone as we would have liked it to." To put it very, very mildly. The administration's record of hysterically high hopes and tragically poor performance is not a media creation.

The failure is not only in Iraq. By shifting attention and resources to Iraq, the administration also short-changed operations in Afganistan, which now appears to be deteriorating daily. The war in Iraq has spurred recruiting for local terrorist groups around the globe.

Even al-Qaeda, badly damaged by America's assault, appears to be rebounding, say some intelligence officials. Thus the recent alert involving financial institutions and the Pentagon's abortive plan to close down its child care operation for safety reasons. The resilience of America's terrorist enemies is not a fault of the media.

Journalists trend left, but that's hardly news. Nor does it explain declining popular support for the administration's Iraq policy.

For instance, The New Republic and The Washington Post editorial page pushed for war. Media critic Howard Kurtz reviewed the Post's pre-war news coverage and found that it downplayed doubts about administration claims.

Moreover, critical coverage of ongoing violence in Iraq dropped off after the formal transfer in sovereignty. Matt Labash of the hawkish Weekly Standard admitted to the NY Press that "if the war's not going quite as you'd like it to go that doesn't mean that the liberal media is thumbing the scale."

It's the media's fault, intone Bush supporters about the public's increasing war doubts. But the media have done nothing more than report on administration policies.

It is the President who is at fault.

He shouldn't have gone to war. His administration bungled the peace. His officials eschewed all responsibility for the resulting mess.

If President Bush wants to convince Americans to support him for a second term, he must own up to his own failures. Otherwise, why would anyone want to grant him an encore performance?

Spanish Flu

info@reason.com (Doug Bandow) — Mon, 15 Mar 2004 00:00:00 EST

When the U.S. assembled its international coalition, ranging from Great Britain to Micronesia, to topple Iraq's Saddam Hussein, it relied on governments willing to override their people's wishes. America's war received popular support in no countries other than Kuwait and Israel.

Now Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar's Popular Party may have paid the ultimate political price for backing the Bush administration, losing an election that it long was expected to win. Other American allies, most notably John Howard in Australia, Tony Blair in Great Britain, and Junichiro Koizumi in Japan, might eventually meet the same end.

Only Britain and Australia offered serious military aid in the war; Poland provided 300 soldiers but begged Washington not to mention its contribution publicly. Most nations—Slovakia, Norway, and scores of others—simply wrote letters of support.

Millions of people around the world marched against the war, but few seemed inclined to punish their governments for backing the U.S. After all, the official letters cost little more than the postage necessary to mail them.

Allied casualties were few even for Britain. And there the opposition supported Prime Minister Blair's pro-American policy. With the war over, Washington promised bountiful goodwill and generous reconstruction contracts for its friends. It looked like a win-win game after all.

No longer.

The failure to find any weapons of mass destruction buried the claim that Iraq threatened world peace and stability. The failure to establish an alliance with al-Qaeda voided the promise that overthrowing Saddam Hussein would weaken Islamic terrorism.

To the contrary, turning Iraq into an unstable protectorate garrisoned by the U.S. and allied states created both a new battleground with and a new, albeit cynical, grievance for terrorists. Blowback to America's friends as well as America seemed inevitable. British sites were hit alongside synagogues in Istanbul, Turkey. The monstrous attack on the Madrid train station increasingly appears to be the work of an al-Qaeda affiliate.

The reaction of Spanish voters was hardly surprising. Many complained that the government had manipulated the investigation, attempting to blame the Spanish separatist group ETA, against which the Aznar government had run a sustained campaign. Officials in Washington played along, in a desperate attempt to aid a friendly government in need.

With evidence suggesting an al-Qaeda connection, however, Spaniards blamed the government for turning them into a target. It is bad enough to take a nation into war based on a mistake or lie. It is horrific to do so when the result is to bring war back to the homefront.

It's important not to read the election upset as a single-issue event. Pre-election polls, which showed the Popular Party ahead by 3 to 5 percent, are no guarantee that the Socialists would not have won in the absence of the Madrid attacks. Doubts about the economy and international trade have drawn support to socialist parties throughout Europe. It certainly wasn't lost on Spaniards that their country had been home to Islamist terror cells prior to the Iraq war, or that, immediately after 9/11, Spain began an aggressive effort to root these cells out. To see the vote solely as a referendum on Iraq is to continue the error of believing every event in every sovereign country is really about America.

Nevertheless, American hawks are already decrying alleged allied weakness. Not only did Prime Minister Aznar's party lose, but incoming Socialist Party Prime Minister Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero announced that he plans to withdraw Spain's 1,300 troops from Iraq when their tour ends in July.

It was bad enough that the French and Germans opposed the U.S. Now, America' paper warriors complain, Washington's few friends are fleeing.

For instance, Rod Dreher, columnist for the Dallas Morning News, calls the Spanish election result, "terrible news. It shows that the Europeans are willing to be cowed by terror into voting for appeasers. Message to terrorists: commit terrorism on the eve of elections, say you're doing it to punish the government for standing by the United States, and you can drive a wedge between Western allies."

However, the real wedge is Washington's demand that allied states act contrary to allied interests. Spain—along with Australia, Britain, Japan, Poland, South Korea, and the rest of the civilized world, in fact—often have cause to work with America.

Containing the Soviet Union, truly an "evil empire," as President Ronald Reagan termed it, was one reason for unity. Combatting transnational terrorism such as al-Qaeda is another. Dealing with regional crises and potential hegemonic threats is yet another.

But it was not in Spain's, or Australia's, or Britain's, or Japan's, or Poland's, or South Korea's interest to back war against Iraq. It is not in their interest to contribute to the occupation force in Iraq. Alas, they all are likely to pay the price for Washington's misguided Iraq invasion, which has made brutal, murderous terrorism more rather than less likely.

As an American, I am happy that other states—the more, the merrier—are willing to alleviate Washington's burden by following the U.S. over the cliff of unnecessary war and endless occupation. But I don't expect them to do so.

Allowing a terrorist attack to influence a democratic election is awful. However, it is hard to begrudge foreign electorates the right to toss out governments that have sacrificed their nations's interests to win favor in Washington.

"We did not want to go to war," demonstrators shouted at Mariano Rajoy, the ruling party's candidate for Spanish prime minister as he voted. Nevertheless, the Popular Party took Spain into war. And the Spanish electorate punished it for doing so.

Voters in Australia, Britain, Japan, Poland, South Korea, and elsewhere might make the same judgment. America's friends should stand with Washington when the cause is just, the action is necessary, and the consequences are positive.

But foreign peoples obviously do not feel blind loyalty to every administration that holds power in Washington. Especially when that administration sacrifices facts for ideology and presses their governments to act against their own wishes.

Cutting the Tripwire

info@reason.com (Doug Bandow) — Tue, 01 Jul 2003 00:00:00 EDT

As the Bush administration prepared for war in Iraq, North Korea steadily raised the nuclear ante, restarting its mothballed reactor and threatening to produce a regular supply of plutonium. As Gulf War II wound down, Undersecretary of State John Bolton declared that North Korea should "draw the appropriate lesson from Iraq." Pyongyang then agreed to talks that included China, while Washington abandoned its precondition that the North eliminate the uranium enrichment program that touched off the crisis. The road ahead almost certainly will be filled with disappointments, frustrations, and threats, with no guarantee that an agreement will be reached.

But why is the U.S. worried about the so-called Democratic People's Republic of Korea? It's a distant and poor country surrounded by far more powerful states; it is an economic irrelevancy and a diplomatic nonentity. Most important, it has no effective means to attack America. North Korea should be a problem for other nations -- for China and Russia, the most important regional powers, and for Japan and South Korea, America's closest regional friends. All have more at stake in the North than we do. Indeed, the only reason Washington is entangled in the Korean peninsula is inertia: The U.S. has defended South Korea for 50 years.

The alliance with the Republic of Korea -- actually a one-sided security guarantee -- has been America's most consistently dangerous commitment since World War II. The nearly 34,000 deaths in the Korean War have been supplemented by further flare-ups, such as the North's 1968 seizure of the USS Pueblo and its 1976 murder of two U.S. soldiers cutting down a tree in the demilitarized zone. Reports of other, unpublicized incidents abound, including full-fledged firefights between American forces and North Korean soldiers entering the South. The Korea Defense Veterans of America estimate that 1,500 Americans have been killed by Northern forces since the Korean War ended.

Yet South Korea is beginning to look away. During his presidential campaign last fall, eventual victor Roh Moo-hyun suggested that his nation "mediate" in any war between America and the North and called for "concessions from both sides." He even added, "We should proudly say we will not side with North Korea or the United States." Before leaving office in February, President Kim Dae-jung attempted to chart an independent course between Washington and Pyongyang. The head of Roh's transition team, Lim Chae-jung, developed a proposal that sought "a concession" from both America and North Korea. This is an alliance?

Although North Korea's nuclear program has understandably attracted Washington's eyes, America's relationship with the South requires equal attention. The nuclear controversy grows out of the unnatural U.S. military presence on the Korean peninsula, and no solution is likely until that presence is removed.

Well before the present contretemps, it was evident that the 37,000 troops in the South were a Cold War artifact that had lost its raison d'être. Washington's commitment was a result of the post�World War II division of the peninsula, the North's subsequent invasion of the South, and China's intervention on the Northern side. After the war ended, South Korea had an unpopular, authoritarian government and a primitive economy. But for Washington's promise to go to war, backed by an occupying garrison, Seoul likely would not have survived another attack.

The Cold War is now over, and Beijing and Moscow are friendlier with Seoul than with Pyongyang. China and Russia trade far more with the South, and the latter has become a significant investor in the People's Republic of China. Russia has even paid off debts by shipping weapons to South Korea. Although both nations retain ties with North Korea -- indeed, both have competed a bit for influence during the last couple of years -- they have far more at stake in the peninsula's continuing stability and the South's continuing prosperity than in the North's "victory," political or military.

Nor does Pyongyang have any other allies of note. With a trail of bad international debts and barely 1 percent of the South's foreign trade, the North is an insignificant economic player. Despite a recent charm offensive that led to official ties with a number of Asian and European nations, the renewed nuclear crisis has brought that diplomatic effort to a halt. Whatever good will North Korea's summit with Japan generated has dissipated; the U.S. will talk about nothing else until the nuclear issue is resolved.

Moreover, the South has left the North far behind economically: It has 40 times the gross domestic product (GDP), twice the population, and an overwhelming technological edge. It took a significant economic hit in the 1997 Asian economic crisis but since then has recovered its status as one of Asia's tigers. In 2000 it enjoyed a GDP of $462 billion, making it the world's 12th largest economy. It significantly outproduces not just North Korea but Russia.

The North is in no position to compete. It is an economic wreck, with an economy that South Korean analysts estimate to have shrunk by half between 1993 and 1996 alone. Its subsequent "recovery" is thought to have pushed per capita GDP to about $700, roughly 40 percent of the 1990 level. Food production is down 60 percent during the last 15 years. Much of the country lacks electricity much of the time. Life expectancy fell 10 percent during the 1990s. During the same decade hundreds of thousands of people -- perhaps as many as 2 million -- starved to death. Approximately six in 10 North Koreans are malnourished. The country has been reduced to begging for millions of tons of food aid.

Only in the military sphere does the North retain any advantage. Even there, its forces are large, but its weapons are ancient, with the newest ones dating to 1990. There is no money for spare parts, and training is nonexistent. Pyongyang's dramatic attempt to launch a satellite in 1998 failed. "The North Korean military is one that is using antiquated 1950s and 1960s vintage weapons," reports Defense Intelligence Agency analyst Bruce Bechtol, "while the South Korean military continues to strengthen itself with dynamic new programs such as the building of brand new F-16s. In addition, the South is superior in other key aspects of military readiness, such as command and control and training."

Although South Korea's ground forces are smaller, they would be fighting on the defensive -- a military advantage -- with superior air and naval support. Indeed, in the initial stage of any war, South Korea would have to rely primarily upon its own military for ground forces, irrespective of America's defense commitment. It would take the U.S. weeks to deploy heavy armored and mechanized reinforcements, depending upon events elsewhere and available lift capabilities.

Moreover, South Korea has begun a serious space program, launching a three-stage liquid-fueled rocket, produced at home, last November; it hopes to launch a satellite in two more years. Seoul also has unveiled plans for an ocean-going navy, one more obviously directed at Japan and China than North Korea.

To the extent that the South's military lags behind its antagonist's, that is a matter of choice, not necessity. Nothing prevents Seoul from building a larger force. Rather, the American tripwire discourages it from doing so. As the South acknowledges in its own defense reports, it chose to focus on economic development at the expense of military strength -- a plan it can follow securely as long as America protects it.

Unfortunately, while the South needs no help to defend itself against its shell of a neighbor, American soldiers are everywhere: arriving at Seoul's international airport, based at the 630-acre Yongsan Army Garrison in downtown Seoul, and on maneuvers around the country. Some number of fights, traffic accidents, and crimes are inevitable. Last fall, when a military court acquitted two soldiers who ran over two children, demonstrations broke out across the nation. Koreans jeered, ostracized, barred from stores, and in a few cases physically attacked their supposed protectors. One American soldier was even kidnapped by a mob after a serviceman refused to accept a leaflet attacking the U.S. over the deaths of the two girls. Some Koreans are boycotting American goods.

Before taking office, President Roh promised not to "kowtow" to the U.S. and called for a more "equal" relationship. All of the presidential candidates -- including the one favored by Washington, conservative Lee Hoi-chang -- demanded a change in the Status of Forces Agreement, which covers a variety of issues involving the investigation and custody of U.S. soldiers accused of a crime. But the nation will never be America's equal as long as America is defending it. Protecting oneself is among the most important attributes of sovereignty. If Seoul instead puts its security in Washington's hands, it is giving Washington authority to make the decisions. No South Korean could expect the U.S. to risk war on the South's terms. And as long as Seoul wants an occupying garrison, it must expect to be treated like an occupied country. That means American forces appropriately receive special protections not available to tourists.

The Status of Forces Agreement has long been a matter of controversy. Earlier revision talks date back to November 2000. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld initially dismissed the possibility of more changes, but the two governments subsequently established a task force to review the agreement. But Washington can go only so far. The U.S. cannot deploy American citizens in other nations and leave them to the tender mercies of local residents, alien cultures, and unfamiliar legal systems. It would be particularly unfair to do so while anti-Americanism is resurgent, since South Korean justice is not immune to such influences. (It was the three soldiers attacked by a Korean mob, and not those who beat them and kidnapped one of them, whom the Korean police charged with assault.) A Status of Forces Agreement is part of the price a nation pays when it turns its security over to another country.

Placing even greater pressure on this unequal arrangement is disagreement about proper policy toward North Korea. Some 24 million people, roughly half of South Korea's population, live in the Seoul-Inchon metropolitan region. Yet Seoul sits barely 25 miles from the border, vulnerable to artillery and Scud missile attack. Thus, the costs of mishandling the North would be horrific for the South. As President Roh has said, war "is such a catastrophic result that I cannot even imagine. We have to handle the North-South relations in such a way that we do not have to face such a situation."

Washington, by contrast, has almost casually considered plunging the peninsula into war. Former President Bill Clinton admits that his administration prepared for a military strike against the North during the first nuclear crisis, without consulting the South. President Roh understandably complained. "We almost went to the brink of war in 1993 with North Korea," he later said, "and at the time we didn't even know it."

Upon what can Seoul rely to avoid a new conflict? There are reports that President Bush rejected a military course after then-President Kim Dae-jung personally described the carnage of the Korean War. Yet Bush explicitly refuses to rule out any option. Secretary Rumsfeld has called the Kim Jong-il government a "terrorist regime," offering an obvious justification for action. And it is hard to find anyone who speaks with administration officials off the record who believes their publicly pacific intentions.

Indeed, some hawks flaunt their lack of concern for Seoul's views. Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) opines that "while they may risk their populations, the United States will do whatever it must to guarantee the security of the American people. And spare us the usual lectures about American unilateralism. We would prefer the company of North Korea's neighbors, but we will make do without it if we must." Frank Gaffney of the Center for Security Policy hits a similar note: "The desire of dangerous nations' neighbors to accommodate, rather than confront, them is understandable. But it should not be determinative of U.S. policy. Such pleading today from South Korea and Japan is reminiscent of the Cold War advocacy for détente by leftists in the West German government." Apparently, America's allies should gaily commit suicide at Washington's command.

Like politicians everywhere, President Roh began dancing toward the political center once elected, calling the U.S.-Korean alliance "precious." The serious possibility of a rupture in the relationship has forced South Koreans to confront the potentially significant budget cost of augmenting their military forces to make up for an American troop withdrawal.

But no policy Band-Aids will save the two nations' relationship. Moving Yongsan base out of Seoul or cutting a few troops ignores the basic issue. Rumsfeld is reportedly considering pulling U.S. troops back from the demilitarized zone, but that would merely expose the deployment's lack of purpose. A tripwire in Pusan is no tripwire, or at least not one with any value.

Why is America still in Korea? The security commitment is the only reason the North breathes fire against Washington. If the U.S. withdrew, Pyongyang would pose no serious threat to us. Today it wields only an untested missile with the theoretical possibility of hitting Alaska or the West Coast, and it knows that attacking America would ensure obliteration. In contrast, leaving forces on the peninsula creates 37,000 nearby nuclear hostages if Pyongyang develops a nuclear arsenal. The troop presence also further strains a military that intends to garrison a defeated Iraq along with the Balkans, all while searching for Al Qaeda worldwide.

Alliances are created at particular times to meet particular threats. They are not ends in themselves, to be preserved no matter how much the world changes. Instead of augmenting its forces in the Pacific and threatening Pyongyang with war, the U.S. should bring home its troops and turn the problem of Pyongyang over to its neighbors, where it belongs.

Who Lost Turkey?

info@reason.com (Doug Bandow) — Tue, 01 Apr 2003 00:00:00 EST

The United States is the world's only superpower. It dominates the globe militarily, economically, and politically. But it has found itself almost alone in the war against Iraq.

Washington wasn't able to win the UN Security Council votes of countries like Angola, Chile, Guinea, and Mexico. Even the offer of some $30 billion in aid did not procure basing rights from Turkey, a long-time ally. The war has barely begun and already plans are being made to punish not Washington's enemies, but its friends who did not support it in Iraq. Popular boycotts are being mounted against France and Germany; the U.S. Ambassador to Canada, Paul Cellucci, has suggested that America's northern neighbor might pay a price in trade for its perfidy.

Before treating the entire world as their enemy, Americans might reflect on why international support was so hard to generate.

A case in point is Turkey. The Turkish parliament's narrow rejection of a government- supported measure to accept up to 62,000 American soldiers, 255 planes, and 65 helicopters was a particularly bitter disappointment, since it hindered America's ability to set up a second front in Iraq's north. Only under great pressure did newly inaugurated Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the undisputed leader of the Justice and Development Party (JDP), win legislative approval for aircraft and missile overflights.

Even so, Congress has declared itself ill-disposed to provide the $1 billion in grants now proposed by the Bush administration. Prime Minister Erdogan rather plaintively penned an article entitled "My Country Is Your Faithful Ally and Friend" for The Wall Street Journal. But few Americans seem to agree.

Ankara is a democracy, however imperfect, and according to some polls 94 percent of Turkish citizens oppose participation in America's war against Iraq. Unprecedented protests by a wide variety of groups preceded the vote; equally vigorous were the celebrations after parliament said no. Although many people in Washington "wanted everyone to believe that Turkey would eventually support the U.S.," notes Abdullah Akyuz, Washington representative of the Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association, they weren't "paying attention to political differences in Turkey."

Ankara has had a rough political and economic ride over the last three decades. Unstable democracy, formal military coups and informal military rule, international conflict involving Cyprus and Greece, and economic crisis.

Until elections last November, Turkey was ruled by a weak coalition between left-wing and nationalist parties. As the ruling majority melted away, parliament voted for elections in which most major parties were destroyed, failing to meet the ten-percent minimum for representation in parliament. Celebrated politicians—Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit, Economic Minister Kemal Dervis, Foreign Minister Ismail Cem—all found themselves out of power.

Only two parties, garnering about 55 percent of the vote, survived. With little more than one-third of the vote, the JDP took nearly two-thirds of the seats in parliament. Although Islamist in orientation, it has spent its first five months in office attempting to prove its centrist bona fides.

That included providing basing rights to the U.S. for the war against Iraq. Washington was so certain of the decision that it had two dozen cargo ships sitting off-shore awaiting Turkey's okay to begin unloading equipment. But to no avail.

Although the administration's public reaction was muted, others in Washington were more free in expressing their bitterness. House Majority Leader Tom DeLay (R-Tex.) suggested that Ankara was trying "to blackmail us." Sen. John D. Rockefeller (D-W.Va.), the ranking Democrat on the Senate intelligence committee, complained that "We spent the last 50 years defending them in NATO. And along comes this opportunity, and by three votes they decline the opportunity to allow us to come in through the north."

Sen. Rockefeller might call the war an "opportunity," but Ankara sees it as anything but that. Akyuz, a vocal friend of America who has immersed himself in Washington's political community, points out that for Turkey the war will bring only costs and risks.

"Turkey has never perceived Iraq and Saddam as a threat," he observes. Indeed, "being a Muslim country creates general sympathy for Iraq." And while the U.S. has emphasized the issue of weapons of mass destruction, "Turkey has never feared possible attacks on its soil."

Thus, a vast majority of Turks—on what issue have 94 percent of Americans agreed in years, if not decades?—are highly suspicious of Washington's motives. "The current government felt it had to side with the U.S.," notes Akyuz, but the decision was solely opportunistic, "not based on principle or the merits of the war." The goal was "minimizing the cost—the political, military, and economic cost."

No one, he adds, defends the war "on principle, to bring democracy or freedom to the region. As in Europe, it is seen as a war to control the region, it is seen as part of a bigger plan of the Bush doctrine. Many believe that control of energy is a major concern. And many believe that security of Israel is a major concern."

At the same time, Turkey looks back at the first Gulf War, which was extremely costly. Cutting cross-border trade with Iraq alone is estimated to have run $30 billion. Economic hardship in Kurdish areas bordering Iraq fueled support for the Kurdistan Worker's Party's bitter insurgency, which ended only in 1999 after 15 years of fighting and nearly 40,000 deaths. More broadly, war has discouraged tourism, a critical source of revenue for Ankara. The new conflict will fall on an economy still in crisis after the collapse of the last two years.

There also are geopolitical concerns. Notes Akyuz, "Turkey is concerned over U.S. interests in northern Iraq. How far will Kurds be able to run an independent state?" Turkey fought no less viciously than Iraq against Kurds seeking independence. This issue "shows that there is a growing distrust, a growing confidence problem" between the two governments, Akyuz argues.

It's no surprise, then, that Ankara asked for compensation for its support. So have Israel, Jordan, and Egypt, even though the latter two are at "little risk," notes Akyuz, and the former, many Turks believe, "should pay the U.S. for getting rid of its major threat in the region." Adds Akyuz, the "only ground on which you can see people defending Turkish support for a U.S.-led war" is that "the consequences [of not doing so] would be enormous for the country."

For all these reasons, popular Turkish opposition remained strong. The U.S. "made the mistake of misreading the country and ruling party," he explains. Although it is a single-party government, there is a "coalition within the party," and a number of factions oppose the war.

Washington expected easy approval, and then "panicked when Turkey delayed." Potential aid figures leaked, resulting in hostile cartoons and commentaries, which were reported in Turkey. "There was a huge reaction in Turkey against the Turkey-bashing," says Akyuz. "The pressure and media coverage backfired."

Which often happens in real democracies.

With the defeat of the basing rights proposal, the promise of additional grants and loans has gone a-glimmering. Washington also has muttered about the possibility of being less helpful in Ankara's pursuit of more IMF aid. Indeed, the Turkish stock market dropped more 15 percent the day after the parliamentary vote.

Yet Washington would lose too if it intensified Turkey's estrangement. Ankara is one of the few secular Islamic democracies—along with Malaysia and, after a fashion, Indonesia.

Moreover, the government is now in the hands of a formally religious party that is struggling with responsible governance. In contrast, in most of the Mideast, such as Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, real democracy likely would mean support for radical Islamists and fundamentalists hostile to the West.

In fact, Turkey is poised between two futures. Even the JDP wants Ankara to look west and join the European Union, but Europe remains reluctant to admit the populous, impoverished Muslim state. (Turkey's population of nearly 70 million ranks second only to Germany's.)

EU membership is not only important for its own sake, offering a path to economic opportunity. It is also a possible key for resolving the division of Cyprus and helping Turkey become free as well as democratic. Cyprus has suffered violence and division for four decades; a year of negotiations under the aegis of the United Nations recently collapsed. Ankara seems anxious to resolve the conflict, in part because a modus vivendi would make EU membership more likely. But Turkish leaders fear a nationalist backlash from pushing Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash too hard. Moreover, America's demands over Iraq, added to political reforms and IMF negotiations, may have helped create political overload in Ankara, diverting the government's attention from Cyprus.

In turn, the breakdown in talks has encouraged Europe to back away from Turkey. EU spokesman Jean-Christophe Filori says that "It appears to us very difficult that accession negotiations can start with Turkey in this situation," even though the EU had previously claimed its willingness to separate the issues. (In fact, Cyprus appears as much to be an excuse for as cause of Europe's position.) But this stance, especially if combined with greater distance from America, makes a solution appear even more distant.

The bogging down of Turkish efforts to join the EU is especially disappointing, Because the prospect of EU membership has encouraged Turkey's move toward genuine liberal democracy. Before leaving office last year Foreign Minister Cem worried about Europe's reluctance to embrace Ankara, telling me that "we bring a lot to the EU." True, but the EU also brings a lot to Turkey. There is "a governing crisis in Turkey," contends Dr. Fuat Keyman, a professor of political science at Ankara's Bilkent University: It is necessary to "transform the state and state-civil relations." The outgoing parliament approved a package of reforms involving freedom of expression and criminal justice protections in order to meet EU accession standards. The JDP supported these measures and seems likely to continue the reform process. At least, it will if doing so makes EU membership more likely.

Serhat Buvenc, a professor of International Relations at Istanbul's Bilgi University, argues that the EU is the "fault line of domestic politics." In his view, the prospect of membership "provides sufficient assurance of the survival of reforms." Soli Ozel, a professor of international relations at Istanbul's Bilgi University, puts it slightly differently: "If the EU were to accommodate Turkey, the entire context of politics would change."

Washington can help. Before losing her seat in last November's election, parliamentarian Ayfer Yilmaz said simply: "We want more trade. We want more investment." A luncheon with Turkish businessmen demonstrated unanimity favoring greater access to America's market to help the Turkish economy to recover from a veritable depression. Fikri Sadi Gucum, a member of the board of directors of Cukurova Holding Co., pointed particularly to Turkey's textile industry.

In fact, the Bush administration has pushed to make Turkey into a Qualified Industrial Zone, which would allow some goods to enter the U.S. duty free. The same policy has been applied to Egypt and Jordan as a reward for cooperating with Israel. Alas, U.S. textile state legislators care little for international concerns. Explained Rep. Robin Hayes (R-NC): "National security is vitally important. I try to look at the big picture. But I have to look out for my district, too."

Even more dismissive is Jock Nash, Washington counsel for Milliken & Co., which benefits from the artificially high prices that it charges American consumers due to trade restrictions. Adopting a trade policy that helps poor countries develop jobs for their people "is just so lame," he says.

Nash prefers that Washington simply write Turkey a check, even though foreign aid has failed dismally for 50 years and does nothing to promote real, self-sustaining economic growth. Moreover, government-to-government aid always has unintended consequences. Dr. Gokhan Capoglu of Bilkent University warns that "U.S. support is seen as not support for Turkey, but support for the government," and risks creating "a backlash," thereby "making the same mistake as in other countries." Washington can offer support, "but it should not do so openly." The most obvious strategy is to support the Turkish people rather than their government—by, for instance, allowing them to sell goods to willing American buyers.

Indeed, Washington's long support for Turkey's admission into the EU seems hypocritical if it is not coupled to a freer trading relationship between the U.S. and Turkey. EU admission would create a far more complex and integrated economic relationship than establishing a freer trade regime. America should act on its own rhetoric.

And while there are good economic reasons not to provide more aid, Washington should encourage trade with and investment in Turkey despite Ankara's adverse decision on Iraq. There are many reasons to criticize Turkish foreign policy over the years, but infidelity to the U.S. is not one. Turkish troops fought alongside Americans in Korea; Ankara backed Washington in Vietnam; Turkey paid a heavy price in the first Gulf War. America should forgive Ankara if its elected politicians choose to listen to their own constituents rather than to U.S. officials in the conflict with Iraq.

Foreign resistance to Washington's offensive in Iraq has created significant, but short-sighted, demands for revenge. However, America has much at stake in its continuing relationship with countries such as Turkey. The U.S. would be best served by preparing the groundwork for improved ties in the future.

Arrogant Americans vs. Irresponsible Germans

info@reason.com (Doug Bandow) — Mon, 14 Oct 2002 00:00:00 EDT

The U.S. remains at war in Afghanistan, has troops searching for terrorists throughout Africa and Southeast Asia, and is preparing to initiate war against Iraq. As if that weren't enemies enough, Richard Perle, chairman of the Defense Policy Board, wants to add Germany to the list, calling on newly-reelected Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder to resign.

Why? Because Schroeder criticized U.S. policy towards Iraq: "Never in my life have I seen relations with a close ally damaged so fast and so deeply," says Perle.

Instead of recoiling at the thought of Berlin proclaiming policy independence, Washington should use the opportunity to push Europe towards defense independence. Without a Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, there is nothing against which America must defend the Europeans.

Unfortunately, neither side has conducted itself with much maturity in the ongoing international spat. The Bush administration believes that allies such as Germany should do what it says, no questions asked. The Schroeder administration believes that Germany deserves a significant say in international relations, while shrinking its military and relying on Washington to resolve tough global problems.

Despite Washington's claims to undisputed international leadership, Berlin is entitled to set its own foreign policy. Even when the Soviet threat helped maintain a degree of European unity, interests between America and its allies often diverged.

It is even more natural today that other NATO members look at the world differently than does America. Especially when it comes to launching an unprovoked war in the world's least stable region.

That Washington believes itself to be the final arbiter of every dispute everywhere on earth bothers some Americans; it certainly should concern Europeans. Stuart Reid, British deputy editor of The Spectator, notes that even some British conservatives have "begun to look to Europe as a bulwark against the spread of American ideas."

In fact, the U.S. will act more responsibly only when confronted with consistent and firm opposition from other major powers. Thus, Washington should be sobered rather than angered that Chancellor Schroeder, backed by German voters, is not enamored with Washington's aggressive plans against Iraq.

Still, it is understandable why Europe has so little influence over American policy. Europe as a whole is a security black hole for America. True, some analysts made much of the fact that after the September 2001 terrorist strikes NATO invoked Article 5 for the first time in its history, formally declaring the attack on the U.S. to be an attack on all.

But expressions of solidarity are cheap. Providing a handful of special forces and lending a couple of AWACS planes would not have been necessary were the U.S. not devoting a substantial share of its military to defending Europe. The Europeans would do far more for America by simply garrisoning their own continent, instead of expecting the U.S. to maintain 100,000 troops to protect populous, prosperous industrialized states, as well as another 13,000 to enforce order in the Balkans, a region of no strategic interest to America.

In short, Europe currently consumes U.S. defense resources while providing few assets in return. Yet the alliance is considering including several Central and Eastern European nations.

Expanding NATO will offer no benefits to America. Rather, doing so will extend U.S. security guarantees to peripheral regions without augmenting Western military power.

And there is no doubt that it would be Washington that would be expected to resolve any new security problems. The membership might be in NATO, but the security guarantee would be American. It's not likely to be German troops confronting Russian forces in, say, any dispute with Latvia.

Washington's goal should be to turn NATO into a European- manned and European-run alliance while concentrating its own resources on genuine threats to its own security. That, however, requires a Germany that is serious about international leadership, including taking a more active military posture.

Obviously history remains a deterrent, though Berlin has begun participating in international military operations, most importantly in the Balkans and Afghanistan. But instead of taking on serious international responsibilities and building a potent, future-oriented military, Berlin lets the U.S. do the heavy lifting and relies on an outmoded conscript force. Indeed, as Washington dramatically hiked military spending—President Bush's proposed increase of $46 billion next year is more than any state other than Russia spends in total—Berlin has steadily shrunk defense outlays.

Washington currently outspends the FRG by more than ten to one. America's force deployment in Germany is the equivalent to almost one-fifth of the entire Bundeswehr.

In short, why should anyone, least of all America, take Germany's international pretensions seriously?

Schroeder unveiled his stance as the peace candidate a bare month before the election, without offering a larger, independent foreign policy vision. That would mean devoting the resources necessary to build a capable military, and ending Germany's and Europe's security dependence on Washington. It would involve joining with other European states to create a genuinely independent military and foreign policy, and refusing to allow the U.S. to use German territory to launch military missions which it opposes.

The last step—forbidding use of German facilities for U.S. military operations—is particularly important. Rhetoric alone will inspire only contempt in Washington. For Chancellor Schroeder to criticize America's plans in Iraq, but not take the one step that might slow down the Bush administration's rush to war, shows that he is interested only in cheap political gain.

Washington has long wanted Europe to do more militarily; Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld recently proposed a rapid reaction force for use outside of Europe. But America still does not want to share decision-making authority with its allies.

Indeed, at the NATO summit in Warsaw Secretary Rumsfeld admitted that the alliance had not been asked—which means it is not likely to be asked—to play a formal role in any war with Iraq: "It hasn't crossed my mind; we've not proposed it."

The administration wants doormats, not allies. Germany and Europe don't have to remain irrelevant, however. The Schroeder- Bush fight offers Berlin and other European states a unique opportunity to strike a more independent course. It's time for Washington to encourage such a change.