Only Half a Billion
Jacob Sullum | June 25, 2008, 6:13pm
Today the U.S. Supreme Court cut a punitive damage award against Exxon for the 1989 Prince William Sound oil spill from $2.5 billion to $500 million. The original award, which had already been reduced by the appeals court, was $5 billion, 10 times the corresponding compensatory damages. In the majority opinion, Justice David Souter (joined by Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas) concludes that a 1-to-1 ratio of punitive to compensatory damages is an appropriate limit in cases like this one, involving the application of maritime law.
That question is different from the constitutional issue addressed by the Court in other cases dealing with punitive damages. In those cases, the Court has ruled that excessively high punitive damages violate the Due Process Clause, and it has indicated that multiples in the double digits are inherently suspect. In this case, by contrast, the Court sought to further the goals of maritime law by reining in "outlier punitive damages awards," thereby making judgments more consistent. The unpredictability of high punitive awards "is in tension with the function of the awards as punitive," says Souter, "because of the implication of unfairness that an eccentrically high punitive verdict carries." Since "most accounts show that the median ratio of punitive to compensatory awards remains less than 1:1," he says, that's a sensible upper limit.
Picking a ratio is inherently arbitrary, but less so than the highly variable judgments rendered by unconstrained judges and juries. "The real problem," Souter says, "is the stark unpredictability of punitive awards." He cites data indicating wide variability and "anecdotal evidence" suggesting that it is not justified by differences in the underlying facts. Maybe so, Justice John Paul Stevens says in his dissent, but this is a problem for Congress to fix. "While maritime law 'is judge-made law to a great extent,'" he writes, "it is also statutory law to a great extent; indeed, '[m]aritime tort law is now dominated by federal statute.'"
I tend to agree that legislation is a more appropriate response to the problems raised by arbitrary, unpredictable punitive awards, and many state legislatures already have imposed limits on punitive damages in the form of ratios or monetary caps. I'd prefer to see states and the federal government abolish punitive damages altogether, keeping civil lawsuits focused on compensation and imposing punishment for especially egregious conduct under criminal law. (Many of the people who said Exxon should pay billions in punitive damages conflated these two goals, arguing that victims of the Exxon Valdez spill were never adequately compensated, which is a separate issue.) But if we must have a parallel system of punishment, it's better to have one with statutory standards like those that govern criminal penalties.
I discussed the Exxon Valdez case in a column last fall.
dpsc | June 25, 2008, 8:03pm | #
My first thought when I saw this on the news was "whoah- nineteen years ago? Am I really that old?" (I'm self-absorbed like that, and remarkably vain given my looks.) I had a look at my birth certificate and it turns out that I am in fact now aged. I'll have to hide that thing so my girlfriend never stumbles across it. I had to admit that I was over 21 when I bought her friends liquor right before her junior prom (which was a blast, btw... really takes me back), but I'm drawing a line in the sand there.
As for this decision, I think it is a good outcome in this particular case, but possibly bad precedent. As the helpful Exxon spokesman pointed out on the nightly news, Exxon has spent more than 3 billion on clean-up, compensation, and fines. On top of that they took an enormous PR hit, and have had to litigate this case since I was... well, that's for me to know and no one else to ever, ever find out. I'd say that that is a sufficient deterrent, in this case, in much the same way that cyanide in random foodstuffs is a sufficient weight-loss aid, one way or another.
The difficulty here is that I do not trust the state, and I do not trust corporations, but I also don't trust my neighbors (i.e. the jury). I trust them all about as far as I can throw them.
It should be noted that I could throw an average neighbor tens of feet if they were compressed into a shape that was more aerodynamic and easier to get a grip on (it's my incessant discus practice that keeps me young-looking). The average multinational- honestly, I doubt I could even lift one without a strong wind in my favor.
But the feds... well, in this case it is strictly a question of how far they could throw me, and the answer is "to the moon, baby, one of these days, right to the moon."
Elemenope | June 26, 2008, 1:24am | #
I'll stand by my statement. The only people in politics who are not, to one degree or another, complicit in payoffs, are pages and interns.
You have to stretch "payoff" to an untenable degree of distortion to come close to the standards for civil liability, and since we're talking about bankrupting the fed with civil suits, it just doesn't fly. It's melodrama to call a salary a "payoff", for example, which seems to be what you are implying.
More to the point, it is melodrama *precisely because* it is impossible to imagine, given any reasonably just system of laws and justice, for an agent of one disparate part of the government being held to account for another. It does not matter whether or not "agents of the state are judged by a separate set of standards", since that set of standards could never include the Agriculture secretary being sued for HUD's shenanigans. And since the budgets are compartmentalized, there is insulation from a runaway take from the coffers.
Absent that, only portions of the government (probably for the most part police agencies) are likely to have liability outstanding that would, in our hypothetical world where the fed is sued for its civil misdeeds, face action and possible bankruptcy.
And this, in the final analysis, is all rather academic. My original point was only that there is nothing *morally repugnant* in penalizing citizens who at least nominally support their government by
1. voting considerably often
2. following most of its laws dutifully
3. not rising as one to slay the agents of the state
for their complicity through inaction or ineffectual action of the civil torts and criminal acts of the state by making them pay, through taxation, for the errors of their duly sworn agents.