The Loan-Filled Lending Crisis
Matt Welch | September 23, 2008, 12:56pm
In the Wall Street Journal, Cato's Alan Reynolds makes the oft-neglected point that, until the last week or so, the presumed national "credit crunch" over the past year has yet to actually reduce the amount of credit:
Bank loans to commercial and industrial business, real estate and consumers continued to expand nearly every month. Commercial and industrial loans exceeded $1.5 trillion this August, up from less than $1.2 trillion a year earlier. Real-estate loans exceeded $3.6 trillion, up from less than $3.4 trillion a year ago. Consumer loans were $845 billion, up from $737 billion. Credit standards are tougher, which is surely a good thing, but interest rates for creditworthy borrowers remain low.
Reynolds also makes a point for those who are suddenly pining for the re-imposition of the Glass-Steagall Act, specifically its ban on commercial banks owning investment banks.
that would mean J.P. Morgan could not have bought Bear Stearns, Bank of America could not have bought Merrill Lynch, Barclays could not buy most of Lehman, and Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley could not become bank holding companies. It is hard to imagine how things would have worked out in that situation, but it surely would not have been an improvement.
Whole thing here. Then, to be transported to a faraway time and place, go read Reynolds' June 1995 reason piece arguing against a federal balanced budget amendment!
DDP | September 23, 2008, 4:07pm | #
Joe, Mo addressed a lot of my thoughts previously, but there are a few points that I would like to add that others have also touched upon.
The issuance of mortgage backed securities correlates very well with lower interest rates, the former having peaked in 2003 as the latter was reduced to record lows by the Fed. Interest rate influences are by far a more powerful driver than the removal of regulations which were never meant to prevent such a crisis, and the data suggests just that. The now failed investment banks still would have taken advantage of the record number of home loans made possible by lower rates, by buying and selling in a record number of MBSs.
And if there was any policy or agency that acted as a driving force, it was Fannie and Freddie. Implicit guarantees has already been mentioned a multitude of times, and should not be ignored. But, more importantly in my mind, these were agencies whose chartered purpose was to make home ownership more available. Why would we be so surprised that they were successful in their efforts? Their purpose was not the prevention of housing bubbles. They were monstrosities and perversions of the market meant to achieve a supposedly desirable social end. This is not a child of the free market. There is a very good reason why the bubble was not in widgets.
If GS had a marginal effect, it was just that, marginal. Heck, even as a libertarian, I can say that deregulating irresponsibly is not advisable. And deregulating is not necessarily a preferable end in itself. But GLB did not cause this crisis, and GLB was not irresponsible deregulation. Progressives that keep pointing this out need to offer more corroborative data than the fact that a banking deregulation act having passed at some point before this crisis.
But I am surely bewildered at how any progressive can look at this data and honestly shout "OMG Free Markets!" (not suggesting that you are doing this at this moment). Craning your neck around the elephants in the room (Fed policy and government policy regarding home ownership) to assign blame to the free market sitting in the corner is not an appropriately honest analysis. While a good case can be made for regulation in the home lending industry and of F&F, the cows have already escaped the barn, closing the doors will solve nothing regarding the current problem.
And that's the fundamental problem with regulation, it tries to solve problems after the damage has been done. That is because the finance industry, like technology, worked much more quickly than the government could/would/should legislate or regulate.
No administration would have stopped this bubble. Not Bush. Not Clinton. Not Bush the Wiser. Not Reagan. Not Carter. Not Ford. Not Nixon. Not LBJ. It is politically untenable to try and do so, and I would guess that you know that. But maybe I'm wrong about that.
We, progressive and libertarians alike can find common ground here. That there is a fundamentally disturbing problem with our system, that neither regulation nor deregulation will solve. Regulation will put bandaids on the patient, but it may hemmorage again elsewhere. Deregulation may only reopen the wound. At some point, we have to administer the medicine.
/end rant