Stunting the Growth of a Mentally Disabled Child--Is It Moral?
Ronald Bailey | January 5, 2007, 10:13am
Physicians have treated a 9-year-old girl, who is severely mentally disabled, by removing her uterus and injecting her with estrogen in order to stunt her growth . The girl, Ashley, is unable to talk, walk, lift her head, clean or feed herself. Her mental development is perpetually stuck at 3 months of age. The stunting was done at the request of her parents who argue that keeping her small means they can more easily care for her at home.
Naturally, this decision has provoked some bioethical handwringing. Uber-bioethicist, Arthur Caplan, at the University of Pennsylvania argues :
"Keeping Ashley small is a pharmacological solution for a social failure — the fact that American society does not do what it should to help severely disabled children and their families."
Actually, we don't know how much help Ashley's family has received from their church, local charities, or even government social services. Even if the family was showered with such "help" as Caplan believes the rest of us should pay for, it is quite possible that they would come to the same conclusion about what is best for Ashley. Such tough decisions should remain in the hands of parents. For what it's worth, based on the evidence I've seen, I think they made the right decision.
Ashley's parents make their case here. Photos of Ashley here.
jp | January 8, 2007, 10:31am | #
In thinking about Larry's comment, I've done some follow-up research on procedures for the termination of life-sustaining treatment of people in permanent vegetative states. It appears that in many (perhaps most) jurisdictions, the surrogate decisionmaker can make the decision to terminate treatment "in an informal forum," and then that decision may be challenged in court by interested parties (including family members, the doctor, and the hospital). If it's challenged, then the surrogate decisionmaker has to meet the legal standard for establishing that the termination of treatment is what the patient would have wanted (or, in some jurisdictions, what a reasonable person would want). See, e.g.,
In re Guardianship of Browning, 543 So. 2d 258 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989). Thus, it appears that, if the surrogate decisionmaker's decision is
not challenged (i.e., the doctor, hospital, etc., go along with it), the life-sustaining treatment is terminated without any judicial review.
Since that seems to be the case for the decision to essentially
end someone's life, and AFAIK it seems to work all right, then I guess a comparable regime will work for the decision whether to stunt a child's development.
One caveat, however, is that the surrogate decisionmaker usually has
some information about the patient's wishes regarding end-of-life treatment, or at least we can consult our own life experiences and extrapolate from how we would want to be treated. On the other hand, with a patient who has never developed beyond a 3-month-old's intelligence, it's obviously impossible to have information about how the patient would want to be treated, and likewise we have no comparable personal knowledge on which we can base guesses about the patient's wishes or foregone experiences. So there is a difference worth considering between the protections that should be afforded to a once-normal adult who became a vegetable and those that should be afforded to a person who never fully developed into self-awareness.