A Reason for Pessimism about John Roberts
Daniel Koffler | July 20, 2005, 3:07pm
A couple of weeks ago Michelle Malkin aptly noted that
There is one fundamental issue that matters more than any other in choosing the next Supreme Court justice--a wartime Supreme Court justice. More than abortion. More than affirmative action. More than the Ten Commandments in courtrooms.
That's exactly why Judge Roberts' ruling last week in the Hamdan v. Rumsfeld case should be troubling to civil libertarians and folks generally concerned with executive branch abuses of power under the guise of national security.
Back in 2004, the Supreme Court decided the Hamdi v. Rumsfeld case (the similar names are coincidental) in a way that raised as many questions as it answered. As Robert Burt of the Yale Law School put it to me in an interview last week, in Hamdi the court hedged its bets, on the one hand rejecting the government's claim of inherent, unreviewable authority to detain prisoners, but also failing to determine just what an adequately impartial review of a detainee's status would consist of. Specifically, the court did not declare that detainees were entitled to review in an Article III (civilian) court, an omission that has at least for now legitimized the executive branch's preferred venue for review--military tribunals.
Salim Ahmed Hamdan, the petitioner in the case that Roberts ruled on, is the former bodyguard to Osama bin Laden and therefore probably very, very guilty. However, as the Hamdi ruling re-emphasized, he is entitled to a day in court. But when there are no established criteria of impartial review and no guarantees of appeal to an Article III judge, his day in court will look like this:
Hamdan has no right to be present at his trial. Unsworn statements, rather than live testimony, can be presented as evidence against him. The presumption of innocence can be taken away from him at any time; so can his right not to testify to avoid self-incrimination. If Hamdan is convicted, he can be sentenced to death.
Roberts approved of that sort of trial on the grounds, in the words of the opinion written by his co-panelist A. Raymond Randolph, that Congress' enabling of the executive branch to use "all necessary and appropriate force" after September 11 was in effect an authorization of review by military tribunals.
Full story on Roberts and Hamdan at Slate. Back in January, Harvey Silverglate unpacked the Supreme Court's rulings on prisoner detention.
thoreau | July 20, 2005, 11:48pm | #
I would welcome your perspective on the idea that Congress gave the Executive war authority for whatever it wants to do with persons taken from Iraqistan. Congress could revoke that authority. Congress could even deny funding for such "nation-building" activities. It seems incomplete to just blame Bush.
Dynamist-
Reasonable point. I should have also cast some blame on the legislative branch as well as the executive. It would be one thing if Congress had spelled out specific circumstances in which alleged terrorists won't be subject to judicial processes. To my knowledge, they didn't really do that. They passed a resolution saying he should (paraphrasing) "take all necessary action against the people responsible for 9/11" and they passed a resolution that (paraphrasing) "authorized the use of force in Iraq".
If my recollection of those resolutions are correct then you can draw one of two conclusions about the treatment of detainees:
1) Congress didn't really authorize the executive branch to do whatever it wants with the people it captures and alleges to be involved in terrorism.
2) Congress did in fact give a blank check, which was grossly irresponsible. We've all seen how well public officials behave when they have blank checks.
So, basically, I remain opposed to any situation in which accused terrorists are held indefinitely without resort to an open, adversarial procedure in a court that is independent of the executive branch.
And if you want to say that they're only being held until the war is over, well, when will the war be over? There needs to be some definite endpoint. In a formally declared war you hold them until Berlin is seized, or Hanoi falls, or the Brits surrender and their armies depart from our shores, or whatever. But the war on terror apparently may never end. Now, it's hard to muster much sympathy for an actual terrorist who spends the rest of his life in prison without trial as a result. But what about the falsely accused?
Yes, I know, the vast majority are probably bad guys. But the whole idea of an independent judiciary is to catch the executive branch's mistakes, however rare they might be, and make sure that the innocent go free. I don't want innocent people held forever without recourse to an independent, fair trial.
Basically, what I see here is the executive branch slipping off its leash. To me that is a libertarian litmus test. I want a justice system that's better than what you'd get in an Islamic theocracy or Communist dictatorship. There needs to be some controlling legal authority, to steal a phrase from a former government employee.
thoreau | July 21, 2005, 8:39am | #
Dynamist-
I think it's an open question as to whether this administration would accept the revocation of the blank check. If I recall correctly, in some of the enemy combatant cases the government's lawyers have argued that the powers in question are inherent in the executive power.
And I recall that prior to the invasion of Iraq some of the Congressional Republicans argued that a declaration of war is unnecessary because the power to make war is inherent in the executive power, and the provision of the Constitution saying Congress declares war is "anachronistic." Now, keep in mind, they weren't arguing (as some on this forum have argued) that a new declaration was unnecessary because the Congressional resolutions from Gulf War I were still applicable, or anything like that. They were simply saying that the President can do whatever he wants.
Which is not a surprising attitude: If the Congress can do whatever it wants in the name of interstate commerce, why not let the President do whatever he wants as Commander in Chief?
Such is yet one more reason why I want the executive branch put on a leash. Yes, the third branch of government can get carried away as well, but the whole idea of checks and balances is that their separate ambitions for power should drive them to fight each other.
So I stand by my argument that there should be trials in Article III courts for the people in question. The only exceptions I would make would be:
1) Enemy soldiers in time of declared war, who are going to be released as soon as the war reaches its defined endpoint. (And even then there should be a process available to those who want to argue that they weren't enemy soldiers, but simply found in the wrong place at the wrong time.)
2) Under extreme circumstances, when the number of prisoners is vast and/or the courts cannot function (e.g. war on our soil), people might need to be held indefinitely
but only until the courts can re-open and catch up with the backlog.
Now, how to define the endpoint? I think the end of Jihadism is the wrong criterion, because there will always be violent religious fanatics. The defeat of Al Qaeda may be a valid criterion, but the implication of holding people until the war is over is that once the war is over they'll be released. I'd rather put alleged Al Qaeda operatives on trial quickly and then, if convicted, lock them up for a long, long time.
RandyAyn | July 21, 2005, 5:50pm | #
gaius,
To be fair, Volokh eventually reconsidered, based on a barrage of counterarguments, the last of which it seems finally brought him to his senses:
[Eugene Volokh, March 19, 2005 at 2:23am] 18 Trackbacks / Possibly More Trackbacks
Mark Kleiman's Extremely Sensible Post Has Persuaded Me
that much as some monsters -- recall that we began with a man who raped and murdered 20 children, and progressed to include Eichmann and various other Nazis -- deserve a deliberately painful death, our society's legal system (no matter what constitutional amendments there may be) can't provide it.
What I found most persuasive about Mark's argument was his points about institutions: about how hard it would be for a jury system to operate when this punishment was available, and how its availability would affect gubernatorial elections, legislative elections, and who knows what else. Even if enough people vote to authorize these punishments constitutionally and legislatively (which I've conceded all along is highly unlikely), there would be such broad, deep, and fervent opposition to them -- much broader, deeper, and more fervent than the opposition to the death penalty -- that attempts to impose the punishments would logjam the criminal justice system and the political system.
And this would be true even when the punishments are sought only for the most heinous of murderers. It's not just that you couldn't find 12 people to convict; it's that the process of trying to find these people, and then execute the judgment they render, will impose huge costs on the legal system (for a few examples, see Mark's post). Whatever one's abstract judgments about the proper severity of punishments, this is a punishment that will not fit with our legal and political culture.
In any event, I much appreciate Mark's instruction on this. Part of me wishes that I could keep disagreeing, out of sheer bullheadedness. But the fact is that he's right, and I was wrong.