Kelo: A Solution
Jeff Taylor | June 24, 2005, 9:05pm
If I'm reading the Supreme Court correctly, if I conduct abortions on my property I'm pretty much untouchable, access to abortions being a fundamental right and all. At least I'd get some kinda strict scrutiny from the courts when the local fascists* come calling.
The big ol' stirrup chair will clash with the dinette, but you do what you have to do.
(*Sorry, I don't know what else to call the illusion of property rights, utterly subjugated to state and corporate aims.)
joe | June 25, 2005, 7:33pm | #
Has anyone else noticed the "Living Constitution"-reliant reasoning in Clarence Thomas's dissent?
"As noted above, the earliest Mill Acts were applied to entities with duties to remain open to the public, and their later extension is not deeply probative of whether that subsequent practice is consistent with the original meaning of the Public Use Clause. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 370 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment). At the time of the founding, “[b]usiness corporations were only beginning to upset the old corporate model, in which the raison d’etre of chartered associations was their service to the public,” Horwitz, supra, at 49—50, so it was natural to those who framed the first Public Use Clauses to think of mills as inherently public entities."
In other words, at the time of the founding, it was "natural to think of" private corporations as being public, because corporations were widely construed to exist to serve the public. Thus, taking land for their benefit did not violate the "public use" clause. But as the understandings and practices that surrounded the operations of corporations changed, it ceased to be "natural to think of" them in this way, and it became "natural to think of" them as being purely private entities, and the taking of land for their benefit ceased to meet the Public Use clause.
Which is a sound, intelligent argument - as understandings and practices change, it becomes necessary to read the meaning of the Constitution in new ways, to account for the new realities. Sometimes, as with the Mill Acts example Thomas calls out, the change of understandings and practices requires exacxtly the opposite interpretation as had formerly been applied.
The term for this recognition of the unavoidalbe realites of applying the Constitution to actual cases is "Living Constitution Jurisprudence." Or, maybe, Clarence Thomas's consitution really is dead, but the date of its passing was circa 1850.