Nizar Nayyouf
January 6, 2004, 1:21am
According to a story Monday in the Dutch newspaper, De Telegraaf (link in Dutch), a Syrian journalist identified as "Nizar Najoef" has identified three locations in Syria where Iraqi WMD is hidden.
"Nizar Najoef" is more commonly spelled Nizar Nayyouf, and he is a remarkable man. He was a journalist and an activist for liberal reform under Hafez Assad, and as a result spent nine years in prison. In his first prison, Nayyouf tried to organize a prisoners' rebellion; he was soon transferred to another prison where he promptly began a hunger strike. Finally, he was sent to a military prison where he was subjected to appalling torture, and is apparently partially paralyzed as a result. Nevertheless, Nayyouf somehow managed to smuggle out information about the torture of his fellow prisoners. Numerous human-rights groups and reporters' organizations tried to intervene in his case; he was finally released in 2001 following a plea from the Vatican. Nayyouf now lives in Europe.
Where does Nayyouf say the WMD is (or was) hidden? In tunnels beneath the town of al-Baida; near the village of Tal Snan; and in "Sjinsjar" (Dutch spelling), a city east of the highway between Hama and Damascus. Nayyouf says he received the information through connections in Syrian intelligence. He believes the U.S. knows all of this, but is biding its time for political reasons. It will act on the information, he told the newspaper, "when the U.S. thinks it's time to see Assad go."
Is there anything to this? Who knows. What's impressive is that, despite paralysis, blindness, and illness due to torture, Nayyouf is still battling the Syrian Baathists. Not long ago he participated in a press conference accusing the regime of still imprisoning a Lebanese man who disappeared 12 years earlier. He's probably right about that. Nayyouf even beat a libel suit brought against him by Syria's former vice president (another Assad), after Nayyouf revealed that he'd ordered the murder of political prisoners. He's irrepressible.
Dan | January 6, 2004, 2:22am | #
I have never written that France is a flawless country; but the notion that France would help Syria hide WMDs smuggled out of Iraq is ludicrous on its face, and would require more than mere rumour to justify as a believeable story
France helped build the Osirak reactor for Hussein *after* he bragged that the war against Israel could continue as soon as an Moslem state had nukes. So there's no doubt that France is pro-WMD, where Iraq is concerned. The only question is: was France willing to risk being pro-Iraq-WMD even after the international community cracked down on Iraq's WMD programs?
Well, either France kept helping Iraq's WMD programs or it didn't. If it didn't, then obviously it's hard to think of many good reasons for France to help cover up whatever WMD programs Iraq had.
But if, on the other hand, France *did* continue to help Iraq with its WMD programs -- and I feel there's considerable evidence that this is the case, even if we don't count the circumstantial evidence of France's excessive enthusiasm for NOT punishing Iraq for sanctions violations -- then Frances had plenty of reason to help the Hussein regime stash its WMDs in good hiding spots.
Do I think the French helped Hussein hide WMDs? I have no opinion on that subject. France had the means and the opportunity, but whether it had the motive remains to be seen.
But as for invading France... um, France is a nuclear power. Even if we wanted to invade them, which we don't, you can't invade a nuclear power unless you want to lose the majority of your population. France, like Russia, China, the United States, and a few other nations, knows that it can do just about anything it wants to without having to worry about military retaliation.
This "nuclear invulnerability" problem is, of course, one of the many arguments for toppling hostile regimes, such as Hussein's, *before* they get nukes.
J.B. | January 6, 2004, 9:37am | #
In light of the fact that we such different opinions on this topic, I genuinely appreciate the warm and open-minded tone that has persisted throughout this discussion. With that said, I would like to take this opportunity to comment on a few of the things that have been mentioned by others participating in the discussion.
Will Spencer made a few points that I believe are worth repeating in asserting that "[r]eleasing information on Syria's posession of Iraqi [WMDs] at this time would be senseless." Mr. Spencer supports his argument by saying that the United States is not in a position to seek out WMDs in Syria in a manner consistent with that in which we sought them out in Iraq. He also correctly notes that diplomatic pressure on Syria ceases to be effective when the United States takes an incontrovertibly hard line against Syria and demands it produce weapons or face the consequences.
But, perhaps the most important point made by Mr. Spencer is that there is no need for us to "justify" the Iraq war at this juncture. As others have alluded, I strongly believe that there are ties between Iraq and a number of WESTERN EUROPEAN governments, as well as ties with Russia, that we cannot afford to make public at this time.
As Andrew said, the so-called "cowboy" White House hasn't clogged arteries to the extent that many liberals would like to have us believe. Because some, like Jean Bart, want us to believe that France and the United States are ready for war (perhaps Thomas Friedman of the Times might concur), I would like to submit a dissent.
On July 4, 1803, President Thomas Jefferson learned of a decision made by Napoleon Bonaparte to accept the United States’ offer to purchase France’s Louisiana Territory. With this transaction, the fledgling American republic doubled in size, and the acquisition of the territory laid the foundation for America’s westward expansion, which had an indelible impact on the development of the nation. Although the Lousiana Purchase represented neither the first nor last instance of cooperation between the two countries, this month Louisiana officials were unable to persuade President George W. Bush and French President Jacques Chirac to attend a celebration of the bicentennial of the Louisiana Purchase. A Louisiana government official stated that the two leaders were not attending the New Orleans festival because of open wounds inflicted during the lead-up to the American-led—and French-opposed—war to oust Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein and France’s continued opposition to postwar Iraqi reconstruction efforts. Based upon this assessment and the general tone that the two countries use when voicing their differences on the Iraq question, it would appear that the relationship between France and the United States has recently suffered a catastrophic setback.
While the nature of the two nations’ relationship has recently become a subject of intense debate in both countries following the ouster of Saddam Hussein by coalition forces, an analysis of the French-American relationship—and of cooperation between the two countries—deserves a more thorough evaluation than is provided by merely considering the Iraq question. It is as incontrovertible that the United States and France have much in common as it is that they sometimes disagree on a number of significant issues. The two countries are arguably the only two states in the modern world who both harbor their own universal ambition and zealously proselytize those ambitions throughout the world. What might be called the fundamental political documents of each state—America’s Bill of Rights and France’s Declaration of the Rights of Man—were both put forth in 1789. Although America, a largely Protestant nation with a soft history of imperialism, is readily distinguishable from the empire-building and Catholic France, over the past centuries the disparate origins of the two countries has been counterbalanced by their universal ambitions, establishing a rivalry—not a hatred—between the two nations.
The countries do often disagree, though not, it will be argued, to a point that irrevocable harm is inflicted upon their relationship or cooperative efforts. For example, in addition to the differences between the United States and France over the war against Iraq, the two nations have also recently struggled with broader disagreements over the geopolitical development of post-Cold War Europe as the continent moves to embrace the former Soviet republics, and they also quarrel over such economic issues as genetically modified (GM) foods. However, through an analysis of economic cooperation between the two countries, I argue that, looking past the disagreement over the war in Iraq, there has not been a fundamental change in the degree or the nature of economic cooperation between the United States and France following the United States’ military intervention in Iraq. Before analyzing the relationship between the United States and France and testing for changes in cooperation between the two countries, it is necessary that distinctions be made about a few of the most important political concepts that relate to this analysis.
In order to analyze the level of cooperation between the United States and France and determine whether it has changed, it is first necessary to define cooperation. For the purposes of this analysis, the definition of cooperation offered by Robert Keohane is appropriate. Keohane defines cooperation as a situation in which “the actions of separate individuals or organizations—which are not in pre-existent harmony—[are] brought into conformity with one another through a process of…policy coordination.” The Keohane definition of cooperation sheds light on two other important concepts: harmony and policy coordination. For the purpose of this analysis, harmony is identified as a situation in which the policies of two states “automatically facilitate the attainment of [the other’s] goals.” Likewise, policy coordination involves “[making] adjustments…such that the adverse consequences of any one decision for other decisions are…[to some extent and frequency] avoided, reduced, counterbalanced, or outweighed.” In the absence of such coordination or cooperation, discord—defined as “a situation in which governments regard each others’ policies as hindering the attainment of their goals”—is the outcome. Because it would be a task of Sisyphus to arrive at a tenable methodoligical system by which one could quantitatively test for a change in cooperation, this analysis will rely upon a qualitative analysis that tests for the persistence of economic cooperation before the Iraqi conflict that remain extant today.
Before embarking upon an examination of contemporary relations between the two nations, it is helpful to note the historical context within which the US-France relationship developed. Following French assistance to the rebelling colonists during the American Revolution, the relationship between the United States and France experienced a largely ineffectual period, as francophile and francophobe presidents rotated in and out of the American White House while the French state was preoccupied with European affairs. Although the two countries signed their first treaty in 1803 in which the United States purchased the Louisiana Territory, the two nations frequently found themselves looking in different directions and lacking either a need or desire to collaborate or cooperate on national levels for most of the nineteenth century. Over time, however, technological improvements in communication and travel strengthened the utility of more advanced exercises of cooperation between the two countries, which reflected a general trend of heightened interest and usefulness for intercontinental alliances. Most importantly, with the Great War and, later, the Second World War, cooperation expanded tremendously. Following the end of World War II, the two nations embarked upon an euduring era of economic, political, and military cooperation on the heels of the Marshall Plan of 1948. In a symbolic gesture of friendship, France in 1949 began waiving the requirement of visas for US citizens traveling to the country. One year later, mutual defense assistance programs began between the two nations. When the American Secretary of State, Colin L. Powell, recently remarked that when called to war, “[Americans] have asked for nothing except enough ground to bury [American troops] in, and otherwise we have returned home…to live our own lives in peace,” he was most directly referring to a 1956 bilateral agreement whereby the United States received permission from France not only to create permanent military cemetaries there, but also to begin the unprecedented construction in France of shared war memorials honoring the side-by-side sacrifices of soldiers representing both countries in World Wars I and II. In addition to fortifying economic and sentimental linkages during this period, a 1961 agreement on atomic weapons systems strengthened military cooperation between the countries, and in 1971 France and the United States joined forces to fight against illegal drug trafficking by coordinating with each other’s efforts in curtailing illicit drugs.
In discussing the US-France relationship in the contemporary context, it would be unwise to omit at least a cursory exploration of the two countries’ dispute over the recent US-led military intervention in Iraq. In The Prince, Machiavelli noted that “[t]here is nothing more difficult to manage, or more doubtful of success, or more dangerous to handle than to take the lead in introducing a new order of things. ” Machiavelli’s observation is significant in that the introduction of new political orders and norms emerged as a significant issue of concern throughout the UN debate over the proper course of action in Iraq, during which France maintained an open objection to the American policy of preemption, which the European nation claimed to be an unprecedented doctrine. Following months of intense discussion on the question of whether or not the regime of Saddam Hussein could be effectively disarmed in the absence of the use of force (it was argued that all prior concessions made by the Iraqi dictator had been achieved either by the use of or threat of using force), on March 1 Paris announced that the nation “[would] not allow a resolution to pass that authorizes resorting to force.” Through this action, France committed an act from which there was no retreat—an accusation, ironically, that it had levied against the American government for its insistence that Iraq disarm or face military consequences. Indeed, France may have implicitly conceded its mistake of so quickly announcing that it would never support intervention in Iraq, as the French Ambassador to the United States, Jean-David Levitte, on November 10 attempted to deny the March 1 statement of Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin. In a letter that appeared in The Washington Post, Levitte asserted that “France…fully subscribed to the objective of disarming Iraq [and] never ruled out the use of force,” contradicting and backpedaling from the statement made by Foreign Minister de Villepin before the initiation of hostilities. Out of this cloud of confusion, pundits espoused diverse observations of the lasting implications of the rift between the centuries-old allies.
In the aftermath of the Iraq conflict, one of the most notably optimistic observations on the state of US-France relations was recently put forth by New York Times reporter Elaine Sciolino, who traveled to Paris following the announced end of major combat operations in Iraq. On her trip to France, Sciolino sought to accurately portray the state of the Franco-American relationship by gauging the opinions of ordinary Americans and Frenchmen. Summarizing her findings, Sciolino wrote that
[I]t’s easy to think relations between France and the United States [are] horribly damaged. But there is another dimension, beyond the deep divide over Iraq: most of the rest of the relationship remains fine.
In making this statement, Sciolino suggested that on issues not relating to Iraq, the United States and France continue to enjoy a mutually beneficial, cordial, and indeed, cooperative, relationship. Sciolino encapsulated this perception with a quote from former UN Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, who remarked of the perceived rift between France and the United States: “This is not as serious as people think.” To bolster these assertions, Sciolino points to what she perceives as a clash of personalities between Presidents Bush and Chirac—perhaps explaining their infrequent visits with one another even before the two leaders grew apart amid disagreements over the Iraq issue. Nevertheless, the point of emphasis for Sciolino remained that the difference over Iraq would not bleed through to other aspects of the relationship such as economic cooperation.
A more pessimistic perspective on the Franco-American relationship is offered by Reason Magazine’s Cathy Young, who argues that “the war in Iraq has escalated tensions between the United States and…[France]—tensions that show no signs of abating after the war’s end.” Young suggests that the tension over the Iraq dispute is a grave sign of impending crisis for the Franco-American relationship. She argues that the tension over Iraq reflects “emotions that were previously channeled, less intensely, into such issues as globalization.” As evidence of tumultuous times and a growingly rocky relationship, Young draws upon unsubstantiated accusations of a vast right-wing write-off in America of Europe and Europeans as a whole and of she further asserts that rising anti-Semitism among the left in France. However, through an analysis of the state of economic cooperation within the relationship, doubts arise concerning the legitimacy of Young’s assertion that cooperation between the United States and France has halted and that the US-France relationship has frozen to the point of reaching absolute zero, as it is evident that instances of economic cooperation that were ongoing prior to the initiation of hostilities have gone uninterrupted in the aftermath of the war.
Economic cooperation is arguably the most important element of the Franco-American relationship, and it remains strong between the two nations. Indeed, economic cooperation and agreements between the nations have experienced no fundamental changes in the aftermath of the Iraq conflict, nor have the nations approached situations of discord or worked to reduce the degree of policy coordination between the two countries. Over the past ten years, American investment in France has nearly doubled, and French investment in the United States nearly quadrupled. The basis of most of the economic investment over the past decade between the two countries has been foreign direct investments (FDI), and the levels of such investments have not significantly declined over the past year. Furthermore, commercial exchanges between the two nations remain strong, and although these commercial exchanges have declined since 2002, this is more accurately attributable to the slowdown of the French economy than to reductions in economic cooperation. For example, France’s attempt at a 35-hour workweek has been blamed for declines in both the domestic and foreign economic outlooks of the country, and even the French government has blamed the decline in trade with the United States on domestic economic constraints—and not nonexistent repercussions that followed their opposition to the war in Iraq. Following the implementation of the 35-hour work week, unemployment has skyrocketed into the double digits in France. Economic cooperation between the nations is also bolstered by the French and American work ethics and a prevailing belief in America as a land of opportunity. Furthermore, policy coordination remains strong, as the revocation of income tax agreements and other treaties signed by the two nations in the last decade have not even been suggested by either country. As Dominique de Villepin put it in an interview with Newsweek, “France wants to work [with] and help the U.S. because we share common values and a common destiny.”
Instead of asserting that economic cooperation has declined as a result of differences over Iraq, it is arguable that both countries have gone to great lengths to ensure that the political fallout over the Iraq question does not carry over to affect the economic situations in either country. For example, in March The New York Times reported that a spillover would occur from the tensions over Iraq and taint the trade environment between France and the United States, squaring with a Wall Street Journal article run one week earlier, which had indicated that France was confident that it would not suffer commercially for opposing the war in Iraq. Indeed, one month later US trade representative Robert B. Zoellick reassured France of just this outcome: under no circumstances, Zoellick said, would the United States extend disagreements on Iraq into acts of economic discord or attempts to undermine or fade out decades-old policy coordination.
More than two hundred years after their relationship began, the United States and France continue to count upon each other for economic, military, and diplomatic support, and like any mature relationship, the relationship between these two nations will likely be shown capable of withstanding the test of time. As the two countries continue to enjoy a remarkable degree of economic cooperation, it is unlikely that their special relationship will permanently fade—although it has undoubtedly temporarily faded—in light of the differences between the two governments over military intervention in Iraq; indeed, although the media tends at times to concentrate solely on the more gloomy aspects of the Franco-American relationship by concentrating on largely technical issues facing both countries, it is evident by analyzing the endurance of economic cooperation between the two states that there remain many ripe grapes on the vine that is the special relationship enjoyed by France and the United States.
Jean Bart | January 6, 2004, 11:17am | #
Dan,
"France helped build the Osirak reactor for Hussein *after* he bragged that the war against Israel could continue as soon as an Moslem state had nukes. So there's no doubt that France is pro-WMD, where Iraq is concerned. The only question is: was France willing to risk being pro-Iraq-WMD even after the international community cracked down on Iraq's WMD programs?"
That's a fucking lie. The fact is that it was General Electric plant, with GE technology, and that the U.S. government approved its construction. Americans always forget this little fact; or rather, they ignore it. The fact is, if France was somehow complicit in giving Iraq a WMD via Osirik, then the U.S. is too. The GE technology could not have been used without American export control approval.
BTW, in 1983, the Iraqi government bragged to the American government, or rather Donald Rumsfeld, that by attacking Iran it was protecting Israel.
"...I feel there's considerable evidence that this is the case.."
Well, show it to us then. This is always the problem with you conspiracy nutjobs; you say you have plenty of evidence, then when it comes time to actually show it, well, there is nothing to show.
"France had the means and the opportunity, but whether it had the motive remains to be seen."
What means and oppurtunity? And it is not even proven that these WMDs in Syria even exist.
Jean Bart | January 6, 2004, 11:36am | #
J.B.,
When the hell have I said that the U.S. and France are ready for war? Are you just lieing for effect?
"However, the difference between U.S. support of Iraq and French support of Iraq is that the U.S. was not continuing to ship Iraq throughout the 1990s illicit materials banned by U.N. sanctions, while France continued to do so."
Prove it. Show me the evidence of this. Again, another conspiracy nutjob makes a claim, and outrageous one, and then fails to back it up. Apparently rumour and innuendo are what pass as "facts" for some people.
And again, the U.S. government supported the building of the Osirik nuclear facility; if France's involvement is so brutal, horrifying, etc., then so America's is as well.
"Indeed, France may have implicitly conceded its mistake of so quickly announcing that it would never support intervention in Iraq..."
I've had to repeat this several times, but I shall do it again - Chirac never said that France would never support military intervention. He did say France would not support such under the then current circumstances. The blantatly dishonest reporting of Chirac's statement I think is a demonstration of what I wrote above about how frankly bigoted some elements of the U.S. are.
"Following the implementation of the 35-hour work week, unemployment has skyrocketed into the double digits in France."
While I do not support the 35-hour week, this is factually incorrect; since its inception, we have not had double-digit unemployment (indeed, before its inception double-digit unemployment was common). The change in the employment level was more a kin to the economic boom in the late 1990s in France than the work week law. However, the fact is that we've not had double-digit unemployment since the mid 1990s.
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